The Management of the Japanese Urban System: Regional Development and Regional Planning in Postwar Japan by Glickman, N.J.
The Management of the 
Japanese Urban System: 
Regional Development and 
Regional Planning in Postwar 
Japan
Glickman, N.J.
 
IIASA Research Memorandum
October 1977
Glickman, N.J. (1977) The Management of the Japanese Urban System: Regional Development and Regional 
Planning in Postwar Japan. IIASA Research Memorandum. Copyright © October 1977 by the author(s). 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/768/ All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this 
work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for 
profit or commercial advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other 
purposes, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting 
repository@iiasa.ac.at 
THE MANAGEMENT O F  THE JAPANESE URBAN SYSTEP4: 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL 
PLANNING I N  POSTWAR JAPAN 
* 
N o r m a n  J.  G l i c k m a n  
O c t o b e r  1 9 7 7  
* 
A l s o  A s s o c i a t e  P r o f e s s o r  of C i t y  P l a n n i n g  and R e g i o n a l  
Science,  U n i v e r s i t y  of P e n n s y l v a n i a ,  3 6 1  M c N e i l  B u i l d -  
i n g / C ~ ,  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  Pennsy lvan ia  1 9 1 7 4 ,  USA. 
C o m m e n t s  should  be addressed t o  t h e  author  there. 
Research Memoranda are interim reports on research being conducted 
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and as such 
receive only limited scientific review. Views or opinions contained 
herein do not necessarily. represent those o f  the Institute or o f  the 
National Member Organizations supporting the Institute. 

P r e f a c e  
T h i s  p a p e r  r e p o r t s  o n  r e s e a r c h  u n d e r t a k e n  w i t h i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  of t h e  IIASA r e s e a r c h  t a s k  o n  Human S e t t l e m e n t  S y s t e m s :  
D e v e l o p m e n t  P r o c e s s e s  a n d  S t r a t e g i e s .  I t  i s  o n e  of a series 
w h i c h  e x a m i n e s  t h e  n a t u r e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  of t h e  J a p a n e s e  
u r b a n  s y s t e m  i n  a i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o n t e x t .  P r o f e s s o r  G l i c k m a n  
h a s  w r i t t e n  t h r e e  o t h e r  p a p e r s  (RM-77-39, RM-77-46, RM-77-48). 
P r o f e s s o r  T a t s u h i k o  Kawashima h a s  w r i t t e n  a n o t h e r  (RM-77-25) . 
P a p e r s  i n  t h e  IIASA S e r i e s  o n  Human S e t t l e m e n t  S y s t e m s :  
D e v e l o p m e n t  P r o c e s s e s  a n d  S t r a t e g i e s  
P e t e r  H a l l ,  N i l e s  Hansen  a n d  H a r r y  S w a i n ,  Urban S y s t e m s :  
A C o m p a r a t i v e  A n a l y s i s  of S t r u c t u r e ,  Change a n d  
P u b l i c  P o l i c y ,  FW-75-35, J u l y  1 9 7 5 .  
N i l e s  H a n s e n ,  A C r i t i q u e  of Economic R e g i o n a l i z a t i o n s  of 
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  RR-75-32, S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 5 .  
N i l e s  H a n s e n ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o o p e r a t i o n  a n d  R e g i o n a l  
P o l i c i e s  W i t h i n  N a t i o n s ,  FW-75-48, S e p t e m b e r  1 9 7 5 .  
P e t e r  H a l l ,  N i l e s  Hansen  a n d  H a r r y  S w a i n ,  S t a t u s  a n d  
F u t u r e  D i r e c t i o n s  of t h e  C o m p a r a t i v e  Urban R e g i o n  
S t u d y :  A Summary of Workshop C o n c l u s i o n s ,  Rbl-75-59, 
November 1975 .  
N i l e s  H a n s e n ,  Growth S t r a t e g i e s  a n d  Human S e t t l e m e n t  
S y s t e m s  i n  D e v e l o p i n g  C o u n t r i e s ,  RP-76-2, J a n u a r y  
1 9 7 6 .  
N i l e s  H a n s e n ,  S y s t e m s  A p p r o a c h e s  t o  Human S e t t l e m e n t s ,  
RM-76-3, J a n u a r y  1976 .  
A l l a n  P r e d ,  The I n t e r u r b a n  T r a n s m i s s i o n  of Growth i n  
Advanced Economics :  E m p i r i c a l  F i n d i n g s  V e r s u s  
R e g i o n a l  P l a n n i n g  A s s u m p t i o n s ,  RR-76-4, March 1 9 7 6 .  
N i l e s  H a n s e n ,  The Economic  Deve lopment  of B o r d e r  R e g i o n s ,  
RM-76-37, A p r i l  1976 .  
P i o t r  Korcell i ,  The Human S e t t l e m e n t  S y s t e m s  S t u d y :  
S u g g e s t e d  R e s e a r c h  D i r e c t i o n s ,  RM-76-38, A p r i l  1976 .  
N i l e s  Hansen, A lsace-Baden-Base l :  Economic I n t e g r a t i o n  
i n  a  Border R e g i o n ,  RM-76-51, June  1976.  
Peter Nijkamp,  S p a t i a l  M o b i l i t y  and S e t t l e m e n t  P a t t e r n s :  
An A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a  Behav iora l  E n t r o p y ,  RM-76-45, 
J u l y  1976. 
N i l e s  Hansen,  Are Reg iona l  Development p o l i c i e s  Needed?,  
RM-76-66, Augus t  1976. 
G a l i n a  K i s e l e v a ,  Commuting: An A n a l y s i s  of  Works by  
S o v i e t  S c h o l a r s ,  RM-76-64, Augus t  1976. 
Koren S h e r r i l l ,  F u n c t i o n a l  Urban Regions  i n  A u s t r i a ,  
RM-76-71, Sep tember  1976. 
N i l e s  Hansen, Economic A s p e c t s  o f  Reg iona l  S e p a r a t i s m ,  
RM-77-10, February  1977. 
Koren S h e r r i l l ,  F u n c t i o n a l  Urban Regions  and C e n t r a l  
P lace  Regions  i n  t h e  Federal  R e p u b l i c  o f  Germany 
and S w i t z e r l a n d ,  RM-77-17, A p r i l  1977. 
T a t s u h i k o  Kawashima, Changes i n  t h e  S p a t i a l  P o p u l a t i o n  
S t r u c t u r e  o f  Japan ,  RM-77-25, June  1977.  
Norman J .  G l i c k m a n ,  Growth and Change i n  t h e  Japanese  
Urban S y s t e m :  The E x p e r i e n c e  o f  t h e  1 9 7 0 s ,  RM-77-39, 
J u l y  1977. 
- iv- 
Abstract 
The record of Japanese postwar economic growth and growth 
management through fiscal and monetary policy and national 
economic planning are reviewed. It is found that national plan- 
ning did not greatly influence economic development. Regional 
planning is viewed as a component of national planning. The 
stages of regional planning goals and strategies and the imple- 
mentation of regional planning laws are analyzed. It is found 
that regional planning was not very effectively implemented 
in the 1960s. A comparison is made with regional planning 
strategies in other developed countries. 
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The Management of the Japanese Urban System: Regional 
Development and Regional Planning in 
Postwar Japan 
1. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN POSTPJAR JAPAN 
In the postwar period, the Japanese economy experienced a 
very high level of economic growth as it recovered from the 
war and rebuilt its economy and its cities. This growth 
brought with it important structural change: a sharp 
reduction of the proportion of the population employed in 
primary industry and the migration of larye numbers of people 
from rural to urban settings. We have discussed these urban 
development and migration patterns at greater length in 
Glickman [ 1  977b, 1977~1 and Glickman and McHone [ 1  9771 so that 
they need not be related again here. Structural change had 
important ramifications for Japan's regions for three principle 
reasons. First, there occurred some depopulation of many rural 
areas. These regions, which include more than a third of the 
nation's municipalities, were seen to be inefficient to support 
the remaining population which was largely old and employed in 
low-productivity agriculture. Second, there was great over- 
crowding in Japan's large cities resulting in several well- 
known negative externalities such as pollution and congestion. 
Third, there was income gap between the richer and poorer 
rural centers which many viewed as being too large. 
The government, at various hierarchical levels, was 
asked to respond to these perceived problems and it did so in 
at least two ways. First, it formulated a series of regional 
plans--components of national plans--which were implemented 
during the postwar period. The experience of Japan in 
relation to national planning and regional development is 
the primary subject of this paper. The second method used 
to attack regional problems was workings of the tax system 
in which revenues collected by the central goverment were 
allocated to local governments, in part on the basis of need. 
The system of intergovernmental relations and revenue sharing 
is the subject of other essays (see Gencer and Glickman [I9761 
and Glickman [1977a]). These two techniques should be viewed as 
complimentary--regional planning and public investment in 
relation to local public finance--although, as we argue below, 
it appears that the tax system was relatively more successful 
at accomplishing many of the goals of overall government policy 
towards regions. 
This paper has four additional sections. In Section 2, we 
review the experience of national economic development and 
planning so that the regional planning efforts, discussed in 
Section 3, can be placed in proper perspective. In Section 3, 
we review the goals and strategies of regional planners, the 
implementation of plans, some of the experience with developing 
nodal "new" industrial cities, and the interlocking tax system. 
We compare the planning experience of Japan with that of some 
other OECD countries, especially France, in Section4. Some 
conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
2. POSTWAR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING 
2.1 Nature and Sources of Postwar Growth 
In this section, we outline the dimensions and sources of 
postwar economic growth in Japan and discuss the management 
of this development through central government fiscal and 
monetary policy and through national economic planning. During 
the period under study, growth of the economy was rapid and 
sustained and was accompanied by growth-oriented government 
policies. We examine the process and nature of national 
economic planning and see how government planners and private 
decision-makers interacted. As we shall note in Section 3, 
regional planning and regional development are best viewed 
within the context of national planning and national growth. 
2.1.1 Nature of Economic Growth 
Patrick and Rosovsky [I9761 and Denison and Chung [I9761 
provide data and analysis of Japanese economic growth in the 
postwar period. They, and other commentators, show that 
economic growth in Japan was spectacular and was accompanied 
by vast economic and social change which.was structural in- 
nature)and massive urbanization. According to Denison and 
Chung, the real growth of national income was 8.77 percent 
1 per year between 1953 and 1971. Over the twenty year period 
1952-1972, current value GNP per capita increased fifteenfold, 
from $182 to $2,823 and real wages increased by a factor of 
three.2 Although there has been a decline in growth in the 
1970s, especially after the so-called "oil shock" of 1973, 
Japanese growth rates continued to be higher than those of the 
most advanced capitalist nations. Full employment has been 
the norm for Japan, with unemployment at essentially frictional 
levels, ranging between 1 and 1.8 percent between 1960 and 1974. 
However, growth was accompanied by considerable price inflation 
which averaged 5 to 6 percent per year from 1960 to 1972 and 
which was much higher in the mid-1970s; particularly, there 
was a very rapid increase in the price of land during that 
time span.4 The lnflati~n was not as burdensome to Japan, how- 
ever, as-to other countries since the real rate of growth was 
so high. 
'For the subset years of 1953-1961 and 1961-1971, average 
annual growth rates were 8.13 percent and 9.20 percent res- 
pectively. 
2 ~ h e  relative strength of Japanese growth relative to other 
countries can be seen from the Denison and Chung [P. 961 
Table 2-12 where growth rates for eleven industrial countries 
are calculated and comparisons with Japan undertaken. For Japan, 
after standardization is made for national income accounting 
practices, the 1953-1971 average annual GNP growth was 9.17 per- 
cent. This can be compared to 3.85 percent per year for the 
United States (1948-1969), 2.29 percent for the United Kingdom 
(1950-1962) and 7.26 percent for West Germany (1950-1962). For 
further analysis and comparison, see Denison and Chung 
[pp. 95-1001. For the time ~eriod 1960-1S75, OECD r1976a1 data 
show Japan's real annual rate of GNP growth at 8.9 percent 
compared to 3.2 percent for the United States, 2.4 percent for 
the United Kingdom, and 5.2 percent for France. 
3 For the first time in postwar history, real GNP declined 
absolutely in 1974, (by 1.7 percent) , although less than in 
other countries. 
'~etween 1952 and 1975, the price index of urban land went 
up by a factor of 58. That index increased by 30 percent in 
1973 alone. For further analysis of Japanese land prices and 
land use, see Glickman and Oguri [ I  9761 . 
2.1.2 Sources of Economic Growth 
The sources of long-term economic growth in Japan were 
many and have been reviewed extensively by several authors. 
Most have argued that there have been several elements in 
the dynamic change which occurred within the Japanese economy. 
First, Japan has possessed a well-educated, well-trained and 
hard-working labor force which was, in a significant way, 
underemployed in low productivity efforts, particularly in 
the primary sector. Over the postwar period, labor was 
shifted from these low-productivity jobs to one in higher- 
productivity areas, particularly manufacturing. A second 
source of growth has been the tremendous increase in the 
physical stock of capital. There has been a very high rate 
of investment in plant and equipment, wit.h the capital stock 
increasing faster than the growth of the labor force.5 This 
high investment rate has been made possible by a very high 
rate of personal savings among Japanese families and a high 
level of reinvestment by Japanese firmsO6 Thus, one of the 
reasons for low labor productivity--that the level of capital 
per worker was very low--dramatically changed in t.he course 
of the 1960s and 1970s as there was robust capital stock growth- 
A third major source of growth has been technological 
change in Japanese industry. Some of this technology has been 
imported from foreign sources, but much has been developed 
through research and development efforts of the Japanese them- 
selves. Fourth, the government has been supportive of growth 
and has fostered growth-oriented policies. The Liberal 
Democratic Party which has governed Japan since 1955 has 
been responsive to demands of its major financial backer, 
51nvestment in plant and equipment in the private business 
sector increased at an average annual rate of 14.4 percent 
between 1952 and 1973; the labor force increased by only 1.49 
percent per year over roughly the same period. 
6For example, gross private investment as a percent of GNP 
increased from 17.2 percent in 1952-1954 to 30.5 percent in 
1970-1971. Gross private savings rose dramatically over the 
same time span from 16.5 percent to 31.9 percent; the latter 
figure is roughly twice the level for the united States; see 
Denison and Chung [pp. 116-119]. Among the reasons given for 
the high savings rate in Japan have been the low level of retire- 
ment benefits and support for the aged and the culture which en- 
courages hard work and savings. 
the business communityI7 in providing many kinds of active 
policies such as subsidies, import protection and related 
items for the purpose of stimulating private business growth. 
There are, of course, other reasons for Japanese economic 
growth, among them the liberation of foreign trade, the impact 
of greater economies of scale, the procurement from American 
military installations (especially during the Korean War) and 
the very low level of non-productive defense expenditures. 8 
An important aspect of the growth'process has been the 
systematic starvation of the public sector for the sake of 
private sector activity. This is manifested in data on the 
public sector, both in terms of comparisons to other Japanese 
economic aggregates and in comparisons to the public sectors 
of other nations. Thus, government consumption grew at an 
average annual rate (in current yen terms) of 14.8 percent 
between 1955 and 1974 while private sector activity grew 
faster. For instance, gross domestic fixed capital formation 
(GDFCF) grew by 17.6 percent and exports by 16.1 percent. 
Government consumption as a proportion of GNP was relatively 
stable between 1955 and 1974, at around 9 percent. At the 
same time, GDFCF increased from 20.1 percent of GNP in 1955 
to 35.0 percent in 1970 and 33.1 percent in 1974.' ~herefofet 
it appears, that private sector investment and export growth-- 
the explicit objects of public policy--were achieved, in part 
- 
at the expense of the public sector. 10 
7 ~ o r  an analysis of this, see Halliday [I 9751 . 
 enis is on and Chung, ' in analyzing the growth of the Japanese 
economy during the period 1961-1971, divide the components of 
the growth process in the following way: additional capital 
represented a 26.9 percent contribution to that decade's growth 
rate, advances in knowledge represented 25.4 percent of the 
growth rate and economies of scale were responsible for 20.5 
percent of Japan's rapid growth. Elements pertaining to the 
labor force were responsible for 28.0 percent of the growth 
rate; divided among greater man-hours, a more efficient alloca- 
tion of labor among sectors, and a greater labor productivity 
due to educational factors. 
'see Japan Bureau of Statistics Office of the Prime Minister [19761. 
'O~rowth was also accompanied by a fall in the share of Gross 
National Expenditures going to private consumption. According to 
EPA data cited by khe Japan Economic Research Center [1975], the 
rates of private consumption expenditures to GNE fell from 64.1 
percent (1 955) to 51.1 percent (1 973) . Japan's public sector is 
also dwarfed by those of other countries. Patrick and Rosovsky 
[Table 1-11] show that in 1971, Japan's government current 
expenditures as a proportion of GNP was 58 percent of similar 
expenditures for the United States and 42 percent of the United 
Kingdom. 
The major share of public capital was devoted to business- 
oriented investments such as for ports, sewers, water supply, land 
reclamation, and roads; relatively little money was spent on social 
programs such as public housing. As Patric~ and Rosovsky [p. 441 
say: 
Government social overhead investments in roads, 
sewage systems, water supplies, and public housing 
was relatively neglected as were welfare and social 
insurance programs, and defense expenditures were 
kept below 1 percent of GNP. 
For instance, according to the Japan Economic Planning 
Agency [I9751 industry-related public investment was 57 percent 
of total investment between 1959 and 1966; it fell to 51 per- 
cent by 1973, in part under the impact of protest by citizens 
who demanded more social (or "life-related") public spending. 
2.2 Consequences of Economic Growth 
The growth which occurred in postwar Japan was accompanied 
by a dramatic structural shift in the organization of the 
economy and the spatial distribution of population and employ- 
ment. Patrick and Rosovsky indicate this through their 
analysis of the change in the proportions of the labor 
force and gross domestic proauct by sector. There was a shift 
from primary industry to the secondary and the tertiary sectors. 
For instance, between 1956 and 1971 the share of labor in the 
primary sector fell from 41.9 to 17.4 percent. Concommitantly, 
the labor force proportion in manufacturing rose from 17.7 to' 
27.2 percent; the tertiary sector increased from 34.1 
to 47.2 percent during the same period. Within these broad 
categories one also sees interesting changes. For instance, 
there was a decline in labor-intensive light industries (such 
as textiles) and an increase in activity in electrical machinery 
(especially consumer electronics), transport, and equipment. 
There was, therefore, a shift from backward, low-productivity 
industry to more modern higher-technology sectors. 1 1  
"AS by Bieda [I 9701 and other have indicated, the Japanese 
economy continues to be highly dualistic, with a large-scale, 
high-technology sector operating beside a more primitive, low- 
technology sector. 
Another ramification of postwar growth and development 
was the rapid change in the spatial distribution of people 
and jobs within Japan. As we have noted in other studies 
ÿÿ lick man [1976, 1977b, 1 9 7 7 ~ 1 ) ~  there has been an increasing 
concentration of an economic activity along the Tokaido 
belt where heavy industry is located. Thus, there were 
tremendous increases in migration to the major metropolitan 
centers--Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya--during the 1950s and 1960s. 
This concentrat'ion reflected a desire for economically-efficient 
spatial allocation of production. Firms which located in the 
Tokaido area were able to take advantage of agglomeration econo- 
mies, and to have access to both foreign and domestic markets. 
Although there was some spatial deconcentration beginning in 
the late 1960s, the period of highest economic growth (1955 to 
1969) saw population increasingly clus'tered in a small number 
of large metropolitan areas. This resulted in many urban and 
social problems which have been associated with high density 
living; these, of course, include pollution, congestion, social 
alienation, and high and rising land prices. Such problems 
were hightened by the low levels of public infrastructure 
devoted to social problems. 
The ramifications of social priorities which fostered 
economic growth on the quality of life can be seen by comparing 
changes of important social indicators with the growth of the 
economy. Patrick and Rosovsky [pp. 28-35] report a set of 
social indicators for Japan, including those for safety, health, 
residential environment, education and culture, work and safety 
and environmental pollution. We have calculated the growth 
rate of these indicators in Table 1 and compared them to changes 
in economic variables. The indicators of social well-being 
grew at approximately 5 percent per year during the 1960s. 
This was less than half of the economic growth rate. It can be ar- 
gued, therefore, that governmental (and societal) uriorities with 
respect to growth resulted in relatively slow increases in 
non-income components of the quality of life. This has 
resulted in a great amount of citizen protest over social 
conditions during the 1970s. 
Table 1  
Average Annual Growth Rates of Major Economic 
and Social Indicators, 1960-1970  
Gross National Expenditures 
(constant prices) 
Private Business Investment 
Safety 
Health 
Residential Environment 
Work and Social welfarea 
Education b 
Environmental ~ollution~ 
Source: Patrick and Rosovsky [ 1 9 7 6 ;  Table 1-41 and 
Japan Economic Research Center [ I  9751 citing 
data from Japan Economic Planning Agency 
Annual Report on National Income Statistics. 
a For 1960-1969.  
b~niversity, college and high school students per age 
group and pupils per teacher in elementary and secondary 
schools. 
2.3 The Management of Growth: Macroeconomic Policy and 
National Economic Plannina 12 
2.3.1 General Themes 
From the earliest postwar governments, the major goal con- 
figuration of economic policy can 'be described, following Ackley 
and Ishi [1976], as a "triad": growth, investment and exports. 
Growth, especially of exports and investment, was seen as both 
a means of recovery from the ravages of the war, but, in later 
years, as the basis of national economic survival. This set 
of goals was proclaimed by Japan's ruling elite, but was 
accepted and widely admired within Japanese society. And the 
goal of growth was supported by strategic government policy in 
the macroeconomic arena: fiscal, monetary policy and national 
economic planning. l 3  ~ u c h  less important were questions of 
equity. Relatively little in the way of income redistribution 
programs were undertaken (either through taxes or transfers) 
which in any way interfered with the major goal of economic 
growth through greater economic efficiency. Although the 
policy of growth management was highly successful, "the 
benefits of growth have not been distributed evenly," say 
2~seful references on economic planning and macroeconomic 
policy include Ackley and Ishi [ 19761 , Fukui [I 9721 , Komiya 
[1975], Okita [1974], Trezise and Suzuki [1976], and Watanabe 
[19701. 
13~here were other government macroeconomic and micro- 
economic policies aimed at growth and development. These 
include industrial development policies which try to develop 
particular industries through tax and subsidy schemes. These 
plans are made by coordinating offices for particular indus- 
ties (called genkyoku) within the government (particularly 
within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and 
with the private industry associations; on this subject see 
Komiya [especially pp. 13-17], and Tresize and Suzuki 
[pp. 792-7971. Ackely and Ishi [pp. 236-2391 
also -discuss the method of "administrative guidance" which 
the government gives to firms and individuals in order to 
influence their behavior. 
Patrick and Rosovsky [p. 351 . 14 
We shall see in Section 3 that interregional equity was 
not an important policy goal in the regional planning process 
either. 
2.3.2 Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
Fiscal policy was used to encourage savings and invest- 
ment as well as exports. Also, fiscal 2olicy involved the 
government in direct investment in productive capital formation. 
Through most of the postwar period, fiscal policy served to 
restrain the economy: largely through the conservative influence 
of the Ministry of Finance, the government's budget has often 
showed a surplus until 1970, which has been used to ~rovide credit 
flor private investment. Monetary policy has been expansionary and 
has been employed to keep interest rates low and to make sure 
that credit was made available to the business community for 
the stimulation of capital-intensive, private investment; 
little in the way of investment funds were devoted to social 
capital such as housing or consumer durables, however. 
I41t is not clear how the income distribution has changed 
during the postwar period. Although Patrick and Rosovsky argue 
that wealth distribution has become more concentrated, they say 
that income distribution is probably more even than it was 
during the 1950s. However, their income distribution data do 
not include capital gains in the definition of income, thus 
confusing intertemporal comparisons. Data on the size distri- 
bution of income described by Sawyer [I9761 show that there 
was some increase in income equality. The lowest quintile of 
families increased its share from 7.8 to 8.7 percent of income, 
while the upper quintile registered a declining share (from 40.2 
to 38.2 percent) between 1962 and 1972. Although per capita 
income distribution figures are not available and international 
comparisons difficult, Japan (along with Sweden and Australia) 
had among the most egalitarian income distribution, as 
measured by Gini coefficients and other measures, of the ten 
countries discussed by Sawyer. On the other hand, Denison and 
Chung [pp. 86-87], show that the share of labor income in 
national income fell from 77.6 percent (1952-1959) to 72.7 
percent (1960-1971). This might indicate a widening of the 
income distribution. Japan was the only country among eleven 
described by Denison and Chung in which the labor share fell 
over time and Japan's labor share was the smallest among the 
eleven. We shall discuss in more detail interregional income 
disparities in Section 3.5.3 below. 
Economic planning was usefully employed to set economic 
goals for the society and to indicate the potential growth 
and distribution of the society's resources. As we shall 
argue, however, economic planning accomplished little that 
could not have been achieved by the confluence of monetary 
and fiscal policy, buoyant domestic aggregate demand and 
the rapid growth of Japan's share of world trade. It is 
to economic planning that we now turn. 
2.3.3 National Economic Planni.ng 
National economic planning began during the American 
occupation and between 1949 and 1976 the Japan'ese government 
formulated ten long-term and medium-term plans. l 5  Throughout, 
the emphasis was on the promotion of economic growth, although 
some consideration was given to the devel2pment of social wel- 
fare measures in later plans. l 6  It is clear that economic 
planning, consistent with other governmental policy, aimed at 
trying to expand the private sector. For, as Okita '[p.l] 
points out in speaking of economic planning: "Japan's 
economic system is not a planned economy but a predominantly 
private enterprise economy." 
5~hese were: "Economic Rehabilitation Plan" (1 949) , 
"Economic Self-support Plan" (1951), "Five Year Plan for 
Economic Self-Support" (1 955) , "New Long-Range Economic Plan" 
(1957), "Plan for Doubling National Income1' (1960), "Medium- 
Term Economic Plan" (1963), "Economic and Social Development 
Plan" (1967), "New Economic and Social Development Plan" (1970), 
"Basic Economic and Social Plan" (1973), and "~conomic Plan for 
the Second Half of the 1970's" (1 976) . 
16phere were various stages in the economic planning. 
The first plans put emphasis on recovery from the war and 
industrial development through export and investment growth. 
Later, some lip-service was given to (an ill-defined) "balanced 
growth" along with price stability and international cooperation. 
In still later stages, beginning in the late 1960s, social wel- 
fare, quality of life and environmental considerations were 
alleged to be important. Okita [I9741 has called these stages 
the "rehabilitation," "self-supporting," and "development" 
stages respectively. On this subject, also see Komiya, 
Each p l a n 1 7  c o n s i s t s  of a se t  of f o r e c a s t s  of  t h e  major  
s e c t o r s  of t h e  n a t i o n ' s  economy ( e . g . ,  G N P ,  e x p o r t s ,  i n v e s t -  
ments ,  government spending)  which have o f t e n  been made u s i n g  
econometr ic  t e c h n i q u e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  l a t e r  
p l a n s ,  t h e r e  have  been q u a l i t a t i v e  g o a l s  a s  w e l l ,  a l t h o u g h  
t h e y  have o f t e n  been q u i t e  vague and g e n e r a l .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  
i n  t h e  1973 B a s i c  Economic and S o c i a l  P l a n  g o a l s  f o r  a i r  po l -  
l u t i o n ,  w a t e r  q u a l i t y  and c i t y  p a r k s  a r e  mentioned.  The 
l a t e s t  p l a n ,  The Economic P l a n  f o r  t h e  Second Half of t h e  
1970s,  was f o r m u l a t e d  i n  197618 p r i n a r i l v  f o c u s e s  on 
J a p a n ' s  economic s i t u a t i o n  i n  a t r a n s i t i o n  p e r i o d  from a high- 
growth t o  a lower-growth s o c i e t y .  Lower growth i s  expec ted  
by Japanese  p l a n n e r s  because  of t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  change i n  t h e  
t e r m s  of t r a d e  between resource -us ing  and resource-consuming 
n a t i o n s .  Japan i s  f a c i n g  s e r i o u s  problems because  it must now 
pay much h i g h e r  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  it i m p o r t s  from 
a b r o a d ,  e s p e c i a l l y  o i l .  T h i s  h a s  r e s u l t e d  i n  a s lowing of t h e  
growth r a t e  of  t h e  economy and c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  
s i n c e  1973. Thus, t h e  p l a n n e r s  p r e d i c t  a growth r a t e  of  o n l y  
6 p e r c e n t  p e r  y e a r  i n  r e a l  t e r m s  between 1976 and 1980. The 
p l a n  a l s o  i n v o l v e s  a l a r g e  number of q u a l i t a t i v e  t a r g e t s  
i n v o l v i n g  s o c i a l  p o l i c y ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  many c a s e s  t h e  g o a l s  a r e  
q u i t e  vague. 
S c h o l a r s  have p a i d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  q u a n t i -  
t a t i v e  economic f o r e c a s t s  which have been made i n  c o n n e c t i o n  
w i t h  n a t i o n a l  p lann ing .  A s  w e  show i n  Tab le  2 ,  t h e  long-term 
I 7 p l a n s  have been c o n s t r u c t e d  by a s e c r e t a r i a t  which 
p r i m a r i l y  c o n s i s t e d  of  t h e  s t a f f  of  t h e  Economic P lann ing  
Agency, w i t h  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of o t h e r  e l ements  i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  
Government bureaucracy .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  was t h e  c o n s t a n t  
i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  f o r m a l l y  th rough  t h e  
Economic Counc i l  ( c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h i r t y  members from t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r )  which had t o  approve p l a n s ,  and i n f o r m a l l y  th rough  t h e  
day-to-day c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  which c h a r a c t e r -  
i z e s  J a p a n e s e  p o l i t i c a l  economy. F i n a l  approva l  of each p l a n  
h a s  been g i v e n  by t h e  C a b i n e t ,  which h a s  never  a l t e r e d  d r a f t  
p l a n s .  
I 8 ~ a p a n  Economic P lann ing  Agency, [ I  9761 . 
Table 2 
Plan 
Five Year Plan 
for Economic 
Self Support 
( 1  9 5 5 )  
New Long-Range 
Economic Plan 
( 1 9 5 7 )  
Planned and Actual Growth of GNP 
Under National Economic Plans 
Plan for Doubling 
National Income 
( 1  9 6 0 )  
Medium-Term 
Economic Plan 
( 1  9 6 5 )  
Economic and Social 
Development Plan 
( 1  9 6 7 )  
New Economic and 
Social Development 
Plan 
( 1  9 7 0 )  
Basic Economic and 
Social Plan 
( 1  9 7 3 )  
Economic Plan for 
the Second Half 
of the 1 9 7 0 s  
( 1  9 7 6 )  
Planned Growth Actual Growth 
Source: Okita [Table 61,  Japan Economic Planning 
Agency 119761 and OECD [ 1 9 7 7 ] .  
a 1973 -1  9 7 6  growth. 
prospects of the Japanese economy have, at least until very 
recently, been grossly understated by plan-makers. For 
example, the actual growth following the 1957 New Long-Range 
Plan was twice the predicted rate. During the National Income 
Doubling Plan (begun in 1960), the planned 1970 private 
investment level was reached in 1961. This constant under- 
estimation of growth has made the plans quickly obsolete and 
has forced the government to make new plans often. Thus, 
Watanabe [I9701 has called Japanese plans "decorative" rather 
than "indicative". 
Moreover, the plans are not binding on either private 
or public decision-makers. As Komiya Lpp. 1 1 1  points 
out: "Nobody feels much obligation to observe its [the plan's] 
figures." Even the planners themselves say that the plans 
are not compulsory. In the introduction to the 1976 plan 
(Japan Economic Planning Agency 11976; p.11 it is stated: 
Of course, it should also be noted that our 
system is based upon a market economy, and the 
economic plan is not intended to regulate min- 
utely all sectors of the economy, nor is there 
anything compulsory about it. Rather, Japanese 
economic plans are attempts (1) to clarify 
preferable directions for economic and social 
development in view of the long-term domestic 
and international outlook, (2) to indicate 
basic policy orientations which should be 
adopted by the government for achieving such 
development, and (3) to provide guidelines 
for personal and corporate behavior. 
Therefore, the plans are not follcwed by actors in the private 
sector, who are anxious to exploit economic advantage that 
they may see, whether or not,there is a plan. 
'some observers have attributed this underestimation to 
poor forecasting procedures. Watanabe [I9701 also attributes 
this to purposeful policy on the part of the government. 
Watanabe argues that the Ministry of ~inance has been anxious 
to keep down the level of government spending, so that it 
makes bearish forecasts of the future growth of the economy. 
This allows the government's fiscal policy to be one of 
restraint as budget surpluses result. For examples of the uses 
of econometric analysis and models in Japan,see Kosobud and Minami 
r19771. Jaoan Economic Plannina Aaencv 11967. 19731. and Flickman 
[I9721 . 
More s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  p l a n s  a r e  n o t  even fol lowed by p u b l i c  
spending,  s i n c e  i n d i v i d u a l  m i n i s t r i e s  determine t h e i r  spending 
t a r g e t s  independen t ly .  By and l a r g e ,  government c a p i t a l  f o r -  
mation i s  determined through t h e  annual  budgetary  p r o c e s s ,  which 
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  long-tzrm c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  p l a n s .  Fur thermore ,  t h e  post-1960 p l ans  a l l  c a l l e d  f o r  
r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s o c i a l  overhead c a p i t a l .  Y e t ,  t h e  r a t i o  
of p u b l i c  t o  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  format ion was v i r t u a l l y  unchanged 
between 1961 and 1973. 20 A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  monetary and f i s c a l  
p o l i c y  were determined o u t s i d e  t h e  scope of t h e  p l an .  It i s  
e s p e c i a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  shor t - t e rm monetary and f i s c a l  p o l i c y  
t a r g e t s  dominated long-term c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of  t h e  p l a n s .  
Though t h e  p l a n s  se t  g o a l s  and t a r g e t s  f o r  t h e  p r i v a t e  
and p u b l i c  s e c t o r s ,  i n  an e f f o r t  t o  reduce  economic u n c e r t a i n -  
t y  and t o  h e l p  p r i v a t e  economic p l ann ing ,  most s c h o l a r s  a rgue  
t h a t  t h e  p l a n s  had l i t t l e  t o  do w i th  i n c r e a s i n g  growth. Th i s  
i s  obvious  s i n c e  a c t u a l  growth ha s  n e a r l y  always exceeded 
planned growth. P lans  may have he lped  t o  reduce  p o t e n t i a l  
b o t t l e n e c k s  w i t h i n  t h e  economy by showing c o n s t r a i n t s  ( i n  an  
inpu t -ou tpu t  format)  t h a t  might  e x i s t  under d i f f e r i n g  s c e n a r i o s  
of  growth. But ,  a s  Ackley and I s h i  s a y ,  t h e  p l a n s '  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
was modest i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  s i n c e  a )  t h e  p l a n s  became o b s o l e t e  
s o  q u i c k l y ,  a )  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  a c t e d  independent ly  of p l a n s ,  and 
c )  M I T I  and o t h e r  agenc i e s  had independent  l i n e s  of communica- 
t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  c l i e n t s  and d i d  n o t  need t h e  
p l a n s '  p r o j e c t i o n s .  
The major accomplishment of  long-term economic p lann ing  
a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  seems t o  have been t h e  exchange of  
in format ion  among t h e  m i n i s t r i e s  of  t h e  government and between 
t h e  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  s e c t o r s .  Thus, even though t h e  p l a n s  
have n o t  been implemented i n  an  op t imal  f a s h i o n ,  t h e  p lann ing  
p roces s  i t s e l f  has  been u s e f u l  i n  t h a t  it has  al lowed t h e  
government t o  under take  i n t e r n a l  d i s c u s s i o n  of  p o l i c y  and t o  
s i g n a l  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  
A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  p a r t i c i p a t e s  i n  t h e s e  
d e l i b e r a t i o n s  and makes known i t s  g o a l s  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  bod ies .  
*Osee T r e z i s e  and Suzuki  [p.  791 1 . 
But, it should be added, such signals could be made without 
formal planning. The government could merely set monetary and 
fiscal policy--as it has done anyway--and use these macro- 
economic tools to guide the economy. The signals of the 
private sector to the public sector could (and have been) 
be made through the normal interaction between the two 
sectors, especially through the activities of the genkyoku 
of MITI and other ministries. 
In sum, then, economic growth was accompanied by macro- 
economic policy that helped set the stage for further growth. 
It seems clear that monetary and fiscal policy were used to 
manage growth and that national economic planning was much 
less important in this process. Planning lacked "teeth" to 
enforce the goals of planners and private economic activity 
was unencumbered by planners' dictums. Also, even public 
sector decision-makers did not follow the outlines of the 
plans in making decisions. Therefore it cannot be said that 
economic planning had an important impact on the course of 
economic events in postwar Japan. 
3. POSTWAR REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND LAND-USE PLANNING 
3.1 Introduction 
As we note in this section, regional economic planning 
is best viewed as a component of national economic planning 
and overall national economic policy. Historically, most 
of the national economic plans had parallel regional com- 
ponents which were augmented with specific regional planning 
laws to foster national goals. Therefcre, it is difficult 
to comprehend regional planning in Japan without a full 
understanding of national planning and national policy. 
Hopefully, the review in Section 2 hel~ed the reader in this 
regard. 
During the postwar period, the major goal of regional 
policy was to make the spatial economy more efficient so as 
to foster economic growth. Efficiency, especially in the 
1950s,  meant taking advantage of agglomeration economies 
within the private sector which were particularly strong in 
t h e  Tokaido megalopolis .  Therefore ,  pub l i c  investment was 
s p a t i a l l y  concent ra ted  i n  t h a t  region and economic development 
was er~couraged t h e r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  heavy i n d u s t r y  such a s  
s t e e l ,  pet rochemicals  and sh ipbu i ld ing .  The s p a t i a l  d i s t r i -  
bu t ion  of product ion made Japan more e f f i c i e n t  i n  i t s  d r i v e  
f o r  export-induced growth. Also,  concen t r a t i on  a long t h e  
P a c i f i c  b e l t  allowed f o r  more e f f i c i e n t  t r a d i n g  wi th  J a p a n ' s  
major t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r ,  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
However, s e v e r a l  r e g i o n a l  problems r e s u l t e d  from t h e s e  
p o l i c i e s .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  was t h e  tremendous overcrowding which 
o c c u r r e d i n  Tokyo and o t h e r  l a r g e  c i t i e s .  Second, t h e r e  was 
t h e  need t o  develop backward a r e a s  such a s  Hokkaido and 
~ o h o k u ,  which were d ra ined  of migrants  t o  t h e  met ropol i t an  
a r e a s .  Thus t h e r e  was a  p o l a r i z a t i o n  of popula t ion  i n t o  over-  
crowded c i t i e s ,  on t h e  one hand, and depopulated r u r a l  a r e a s  
on t h e  o t h e r .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  was a  perceived need t o  reduce 
i n t e r r e g i o n a l  iicome d i s p a r i t i e s  between t h e  me t ropo l i t an  
r eg ions  and t h e  more r u r a l ,  less developed ones. 
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  w i l l  d i s c u s s  t h e  techniques  and 
ins t ruments  used t o  d e a l  w i th  t h e s e  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  r e g i o n a l  
problems. Government a n a l y s t s  have be l ieved  t h a t  t h e s e  
problems r equ i r ed  a  po l i cy  of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of jobs  and 
popula t ion .  The Japanese  government has a t tempted t o  decent ra -  
l i z e  t h e  economy, and has had s e v e r a l  approaches t o  r e g i o n a l  
development: nodal  development of c i t i e s  such a s  i n  t h e  New 
I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and Spec i a l  Areas,  l a r g e  s c a l e  p r o j e c t s  
such a s  p o r t  development i n  Tohoku and eJ.sewhere, i n f r a s t r u c -  
t u r e  development through g r a n t s  t o  l o c a l  governments and 
d i r e c t  investments by t h e  c e n t r a l  government, i n d u s t r i a l  
r e l o c a t i o n  schemes through i n c e n t i v e s  t o  manufacturers ,  and 
" s t e e r i n g "  p o l i c i e s  i n  which on an informal  b a s i s  t h e  govern- 
ment gave advice  t o  businessmen on where they should l o c a t e  
t h e i r  p l a n t s .  Add i t i ona l ly ,  t h e  government has t r i e d  t o  
f o s t e r  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  and, p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  
income d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  through complicated t a x  and subsidy 
programs. 
However, d e s p i t e  r h e t o r i c  t o  t h e  con t r a ry ,  t h e  government 
has never had a  very s t r o n g  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  po l icy .  Pub l i c  
investment remained heavily concentrated in regions central 
to the economy until the late 1960s and was not destined for 
the more backward regions until later. We shall show this 
in Section 3.3.1 below. As with the case of national planning, 
the "equity-versus-efficiency" trade-off has been a difficult 
one and, in general, regional planning efforts have been used 
to increase the efficiency of the economy through spatially 
concentrated public investmenttat the expense of interregional 
and interpersonal equity. There have been some decreases in 
interregional income disparities and, although there has been 
some decentralization of jobs and population (see Glickman 
[1977b]), these phenomenon have not been primarily the result 
of planning. 
In Section 3.2 we offer some notes on regional economic 
planning and its relationship to national planning during the 
postwar period, observing the evolution of planning objectives. 
The implementation of regional planning with respect to public 
investment trends and evaluation of the New Industrial Cities 
and Special Areas programs are the major concerns of Section 
3.3. The relationship between regional planning and the tax 
system is studied in Section 3.4. Some additional evidence 
and conclusions are offered in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Regional Planning and National Economic Planning 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Regional planning in Japan is best viewed as an offshoot 
of national economic planning as it has reflected national 
goals and a style of planning used at a national level. Thus, 
regional planning has reflected the growth orientation of 
national plans in the early years and a somewhat more balanced 
approach and environmental concerns of the national planners 
in later years; we shall see this in the section 3.2.2 below. 
Additionally, regional planning was organized along "top-down" 
principles, with national goals and organizations2' dbminating 
those on the regional and local levels- 
- 
2 1 ~ e e  Miyasawa 119771 and Glickman [I9721 on this issue. 
For analyses of Japanese organizational structures and decision- 
making processes in general, see Vogel 119751. 
F i n a l l y ,  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g - - l i k e  n a t i o n a l  p lanning-- lacked t h e  
enforcement  p r o c e d u r e s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  i n f l u e n c e  
p r i v a t e  decis ion-makers  t o  a c t  i n  ways t h a t  p l a n n e r s  d e s i r e d .  
A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,  p r i v a t e  and p u b l i c  d e c i s i o n -  
makers a c t e d  somewhat i n d e p e n d e n t l y  of p l a n s .  
3.2.2 S t a g e s  of  Reg iona l  Development P l a n n i n g  22 
A s  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,  t h e r e  w e r e  v a r i o u s  s t a g e s  of 
t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  r e g i o n a l  problems and r e g i o n a l  development 
p o l i c y .  There  have been f i v e  such s t a g e s  w i t h i n  t h e  pos twar  
p e r i o d . 2 3  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  w e  review t h e s e  s t a g e s  and i n d i c a t e  
how t h e  g o a l s  and methods o f  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p r o c e s s  changed o v e r  
t i m e .  Table  3  summarizes t h e  major  n a t i o n a l  and r e g i o n a l  
p l a n n i n g  laws.  W e  w i l l  n o t e  t h e  many g o a l s  set  by r e g i o n a l  
p l a n n e r s  (some of  which were mutua l ly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y )  and t h e  
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  number of  r e g i o n s  o v e r  which development funds  
w e r e  t o  be  s p r e a d .  
The f i r s t  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  s t a g e  was r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
problem o f  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  Japan from t h e  war,  and o c c u r r e d  bet-;  
ween 1945 and rough ly  1950. The g o a l s  w e r e  t o  r e p a i r  war 
damage, t o  employ t h e  many r e p a t r i a t e d  Japanese  r e t u r n i n g  from 
o v e r s e a s ,  t o  s h a r p l y  i n c r e a s e  food p r o d u c t i o n ,  and t o  recon- 
s t r u c t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  b a s e  and t h e  c i t i e s .  24 
The second phase  o f  Japanese  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  took  p l a c e  
i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  1950s d u r i n g  t h e  s t a g e  o f  economic re- 
c o n s t r u c t i o n .  I n  p a r t  under  t h e  impetus  of  t h e  supp ly  a c t i v i t y  
connected  w i t h  t h e  U.S. involvment  i n  t h e  Korean war ,  Japan 
2 2 ~ o r  o t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,  see Beika 
[I9751 and OECD [ 1971 I 1976bI 
2 3 ~ h e r e  was a l s o  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  i n  t h e  
prewar p e r i o d .  I n  1941, a  P l a n n i n g  Committee (Kikaku-in,  i n  
J a p a n e s e )  was e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  G r e a t  E a s t  ~ s s n  
N a t i o n a l  Land P l a n n i n g  A c t .  There was a  15-year  t ime h o r i z o n  
t o  d e a l  w i t h  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e ,  i n d u s t r i a l  development ,  food 
p r o d u c t i o n ,  and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n .  There was an  e f f o r t  t o  have 
a  "harmonious" r e l a t i o n s h i p  between urban and r u r a l  a c t i v i t y  
and a  r e g i o n a l  b a l a n c e  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  l o c a t i o n .  Here, however, 
s t r a t e g i c  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  was t h e  main p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e .  
- ,. 
L 4  Laws were passed  i n  t h i s  t ime p e r i o d  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  L i v e l i -  
hood P r o t e c t i o n  Law (1946) t h e  Temporary S p e c i a l  C i t y  and Town 
P l a n n i n g  Act  ( 1 9 4 6 ) ,  and t h e  Employment S e c u r i t y  Act ( 1 9 4 7 ) .  
1954 
3 )  T h i r d  P e r i o d  1955  
1956 
Table 3 
Major L e g i s l a t i o n  Concerning Regional  Development 
PERIOD YEAR NATIONAL COMPRE- DEVELOPMENT ACT REGIONAL DEVELOP- OTHER COMPREHENSIVE 
HENSIVE PLANNING MENT PLANNING ACT PLANNING AND DEVE- 
LOPMENT ACTS 
1 )  F i r s t  P e r i o d  1 9 4 6  Temporary S p e c i a l  
19Q5-1950 c i t y  and town p lan-  
n i n g  Act ( a b o l i s h e d  
1954)  
2 )  Second P e r i o d  1950 Genera l  N a t i o n a l  Hokkaieo Develop- 
1950-1955 Land Development ment Act 
A c t  N a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  
P o r t  Act C o n s t r u c t i o n  Act 
1951  Amendment t o  River  
Act  
1952 E l e c t r i c  Resources 
Development Promo- 
t i o n  Act 
1953 P o r t  Adjustment  
Promoting Act  
Cho, Son Annexation 
Promoting Act 
Land R e o r g a n i z a t i o n  
Act  
A i c h i  I r r i g a t i o n  
Coopera t ion  A c t  
P r i n c i p l e  Driveaway N a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  Act M e t r o p o l i t a n  
Water Works f o r  Region Act 
I n d u s t r y  Act 
A i r p o r t  Adjustment  
A c t  
New S h i ,  Cho, Son 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  
Promoting Act 
N a t i o n a l  Highway Tohoku Development 
C o n s t r u c t i o n  Act  Act  
f o r  N a t i o n a l  Land 
Development 
S p e c i f i c  Mul t i -  
Purpose Dam Act  
1958 F i v e  y e a r  S t r e e t  I n d u s t r i a l  Water 
Adjustment  P l a n  Channel Construc-  
t i o n  Act 
I n d u s t r i a l  Water 
Q u a l i t y  P r o t e c t i o n  
Act 
1959 
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
~ y u s h u  E l e c t r i c  
Company 
I n d u s t r i a l  Develop- E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
ment Cont ro l  Act i n  N a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  
t h e  Redy-Developed T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  Co- 
Areas  of  t h e  N a t i o n a l  o p e r a t i o n  
C a p i t a l  M e t r o p o l i t a n  
Region 
Kyushu Development 
Act  
S p e c i a l  Measurements 
f o r  Adjustment o f  Spe- 
c i f i c  F a c i l i t i e s  i n  P o r t  
and River  Act 
Table  3 (con t inued)  
PERIOD YEAR NATIONAL COMPRE- DEVELOPMENT ACT REGIONAL DEVELOP- OTHER COMPREHENSIVE 
HENSIVE PLANNING MENT PLANNING ACT PLANNING AND DEVE- 
LOPMENT ACTS 
Shikoku Development Act 4 )  F o u r t h  P e r i o d  1960 Ten Year Income 
Doubling P lan  Hokuriku Development 
Act 
Chugoku Development Act 
Tokaido Trunk Highway 
Act 
E x p e d i t i n g  I n d u s t r i a l  
~ e v e l o p m e n t  Act o f  
under-developed Areas ' 
1961 The P a c i f i c  Ocean Emergency Mea- 
B e l t  P l a n  surment Act o f  
P o r t  Adjustment 
Water Resources 
Development 
Promotion Act 
Temporary Measurement 
Act f o r  Promotion o f  
Coal Mining Areas 
Water Resources 
Cooperat ion Act  
1962 N a t i o n a l  Compre- 
h e n s i v e  Develop- 
ment P l a n  
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y  
C o n s t r u c t i o n  Expedi- 
t i n g  Act  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
Water Resources 
Coopera t ion  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
Committee Tokyo Bay 
Comprehensive De- 
velopment Promotion 
Repor t  o f  Committee 
f o r  Temporary 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  
Japan  R a i l r o a d  Con- 
s t r u c t i o n  Coopera t ion  
D e s i g n a t i o n  o f  New 
I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  
E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  New 
Tokyo I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
A i r p o r t  Coopera t ion  
Kinki  Region Act 
River  Act S p e c i a l  Areas f o r  
I n d u s t r i a l  Consol i-  
d a t i o n  Expedi t ing  
Act  
N a t i o n a l  Trunk 
Highway Construc-  
t i o n  Act f o r  Na- 
t i o n a l  Land Deve- 
lopmen t 
Chubu Region Deve- 
lopment Act 
Fundamental Act 
f o r  Environmental  
C o n t r o l  
Genera l  P r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  Urban P o l i c y  o f  
t h e  L i b e r a l  Democra- 
t i c  P a r t y  
C i t y  P lanning  Act  
1968 C i t y  P lanning  Act  Genera l  P r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  Urban P o l i c y  o f  
t h e  L i b e r a l  Democrat ic  
P a r t y  
F i f t h  P e r i o d  1969 New Comprehensive 
N a t i o n a l  Develop- 
ment P l a n  
Urban ~ e n e w a l  Act  
N a t i o n a l  New Trunk 
Railway Adjustment 
Act 
I n d u c t i o n  o f  Indus-  
t r y  t o  A g r i c u l t u r a l  
Land A c t  
1972 Tanaka P lan  f o r  
B u i l d i h g  a  New 
Japan  
1974 
I n d u s t r i a l  Reloca- 
t i o n  E x p e d i t i n g  A c t  
N a t i o n a l  Land Use 
A c t  
began t o  grow. And t h e  goa l s  of r e g i o n a l  p lanning  dur ing  t h e  
pe r iod  1950 t o  1955 were t o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  growth process :  
t o  i n c r e a s e  employment, t o  i n c r e a s e  food product ion wi th  t h e  
development of  underdeveloped r eg ions ,  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  t h e  
r a p i d l y  growing a r e a s  ( i n  t h i s  r ega rd ,  a r e a s  wi th  g r e a t  
growth p o t e n t i a l  were t a r g e t e d  f o r  s p e c i a l  development) ,  and 
t o  under take e l e c t r i c  power and wate r  r e sou rces  development i n  
an e f f o r t  t o  i n c r e a s e  i n d u s t r i a l  p roduc t ion .  
The major p i e c e  of l e g i s l a t i o n  du r ing  t h a t  pe r iod  was 
t h e  Comprehensive Nat iona l  Land Development Act (CNDLA) 2 5  which 
was passed i n  1950. I t  was J a p a n ' s  f i r s t  nationwide r e g i o n a l  
development law and it had economic growth a s  i t s  most important  
goa l .  I t  a l s o  i n d i c a t e d  a "top-down" approach t o  r e g i o n a l  
development planning:  n a t i o n a l  laws were t o  be passed t o  dea l  
wi th  r e g i o n a l  problems. The CNLDA's  aims were t o  develop and 
t o  conserve t h e  n a t i o n a l  l and  i n  a comprehensive manner, t o  
have a more e f f i c i e n t  s p a t i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t o  
improve s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,  t o  have comprehensive p lanning  a t  each 
governmental l e v e l ,  t o  i n c r e a s e  food product ion and t o  develop 
power r e s o u r c e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  wate r  power. The p l anne r s  s e t  up 
twenty one r i v e r  bas in  d i s t r i c t s 2 6  a s  s p e c i a l  a r e a s  and attemp- 
t e d  comprehensive p lanning  f o r  t h o s e  reg ions .  This  was q u i t e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  TVA model which had been implemented i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  beginning i n  t h e  1930s. 27 
The n e x t  pe r iod  of r e g i o n a l  development p lanning  took 
p l ace  between 1955 and 1960, wi th  very vague and gene ra l  p lans  
made wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  reg ions .  There was a p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i z a t i o n  
t h a t  t h e  overcrowding i n  t h e  major met ropol i t an  a r e a s  was i n  
some way bad and t h a t  t h e r e  was a need f o r  more e f f i c i e n t  l and  
u t i l i z a t i o n ,  implying t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t o  s p a t i a l l y  d e c e n t r a l i z e  
2 5 ~ n  Japanese ,  Kokudo Sogo Kaihatsu - Ho 
2 6 0 r i g i n a l l y  4 2  of  J apan ' s  47 p r e f e c t u r e s  were s e l e c t e d  
a s  s p e c i a l  a r e a s  f o r  development under t h e  CNDLA. This  was 
regarded a s  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which r e sou rces  were being spread  
t o o  t h i n l y  and, a s  a p o l i t i c a l  compromise, t h e  2 1  r i v e r  b a s i n s  
were chosen. This  was s t i l l  a l a r g e  number of r eg ions  f o r  a 
then-poor country .  
2 7 ~ o s t  obse rve r s  argue t h a t  t h e  CNDLA d i d  n o t  succeed because 
of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  problems; on t h i s  s u b j e c t  s e e  Beika.  
t h e  economy. However, t h e  g o a l  of  having a  more ba lanced  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  and a  more e q u i t a b l e  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  income came 
i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  g o a l  of  growth d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  of h i g h  
growth f o r  t h e  Japanese  economy. I n  t e r m s  of  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g ,  t h e r e  
was an emphasis  on  heavy and chemical  i n d u s t r i e s  a l o n g  t h e  P a c i f i c  
c o a s t  and t h e r e  was much p u b l i c  works inves tment  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  
development n e a r  t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s , b u t  n o t  i n  poor ,  remote r e g i o n s .  28 
A s  a  r e s u l t ,  economic e f f i c i e n c y  g o a l s  dominated t h o s e  o f  i n t e r r e -  
g i o n a l  e q u i t y .  
The p e r i o d  from 1960 t o  1969 c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  f o u r t h  s t a g e  
o f  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  i n  Japan .  T h i s  was t h e  e r a  o f  t h e  Income 
Doubling P l a n  i n  which h i g h  n a t i o n a l  growth was f o r e c a s t e d  and 
a t t a i n e d .  On t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l ,  p l a n n e r s  g o t  more s p e c i f i c  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e g i o n s  ( i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  more g e n e r a l  no- 
t i o n s  o f  r e g i o n a l  development i n  a  p r e v i o u s  p e r i o d ) ,  and growth 
p o l e  development was i n i t i a t e d .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  major  g o a l s  o f  
p l a n n i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  1960s,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  growth p o l e  develop-  
ment,  was f o r  " b i g  p r o j e c t "  r e g i o n a l  development o f  p o r t s  and 
o t h e r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  n a t i o n a l  t r a n s p o r -  
t a t i o n  networks ( e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  Shinkansen h i g h  speed r a i l r o a d ) ,  
t h e  promotion o f  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  need t o  decen- 
t r a l i z e  p o p u l a t i o n  from m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s ,  and t h e  r e d u c t i o n  
o f  income d i s p a r i t i e s  among r e g i o n s .  However, f o r  r e a s o n s  
o f  economic e f f i c i e n c y ,  p l a n n e r s  a l s o  a i d e d  t h e  development o f  
heavy and chemical  i n d u s t r i e s  a l o n g  t h e  P a c i f i c  b e l t .  A s  n o t e d  
i n  Tab le  3 ,  s e v e r a l  laws w e r e  p a s s e d  d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d  i n -  
c l u d i n g  t h e  Comprehensive N a t i o n a l  Development P l a n  (1962) and 
two laws which w e r e  p a s s e d  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  CNDP: t h e  
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y  C o n s t r u c t i o n  A c t  (1962) 2 9  and t h e  A c t  f o r  
Promotion o f  S p e c i a l  Areas f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  Development (1964) . 3  0  
2 8 ~ u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h e r e  w e r e  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n i n g  a c t s  
p a s s e d  f o r  N a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  Region (1956) and t h o s e  f o r  under-  
developed r e g i o n s  such Kyushu ( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  Tohoku (1959) and Shikoku 
( 1 9 6 0 ) ;  see Japan N a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  Region Development Commission 
[1971] .  
2 9 ~ h i n  Sanqyo Toshi-Eokushin Eo 
-
3 0 ~ o g y o  S e i b i  Tokubetsu C h i i k i  Kogyo Ka iha t su  Sokushin Ho - 
The 1962 CNDP sought  t o  reduce  o v e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n  i n  t h e  
major  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s  and t o  h e l p  develop r u r a l  ones :  t h u s ,  
"balanced growth" i n  an i n t e r r e g i o n a l  s e n s e  was t h e  key ele- 
ment h e r e .  Few new o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  were i n s t i t u t e d  
under t h e  P l a n ,  b u t  t h e r e  was a  r e s h u f f l i n g  of o l d  ones f o r  
purposes  o f  b e t t e r  c o o r d i n a t i o n .  Impor t an t l y ,  t h e  n o t i o n  of 
noda l  o r  growth p o l e  development was i n i t i t a t e d  a s  t h e  major 
format  f o r  r e g i o n a l  development.  The p l a n  concep tua l i z ed  some 
f a i r l y  l a r g e  growth c e n t e r s  away from Tokyo and t h e  o t h e r  l a r g e  
r e g i o n s ,  and some s m a l l e r  c e n t e r s  which w e r e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  
l a r g e r  ones  th rough  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and communication l i n k s ;  
c e n t r a l  management f u n c t i o n s  were t o  be  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
l a r g e r  growth c e n t e r s .  
The CNDP d i v i d e d  t h e  n a t i o n  i n t o  t h r e e  a r e a s .  The f i r s t  
was f o r  t h o s e  o f  t h e  " exces s ive  c o n c e n t r a t i o n "  ( t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s )  
where measures were i n s t i t u t e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e s t r a i n  f u r t h e r  
growth; t h e s e  i nc luded  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i n d u s t r i a l  development 
and a s s i s t a n c e  t o  f a c t o r i e s  s eek ing  t o  r e l o c a t e .  31 The second 
c a t eg o ry  o f  l a n d  use  was f o r  c i t i e s  o u t s i d e  of  t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s  
known a s  " a r e a s  o f  ad jus tment" .  H e r e ,  t h e  e f f o r t  was t o  es- 
t a b l i s h  suburban growth cen t e r s - - t hus  e x p e d i t i n g  m e t r o p o l i t a n  
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n - - a n d  t o  induce  i n d u s t r i a l  development t h e r e .  
The t h i r d  s e t  of a r e a s ,  t h e  "development a r e a s " ,  were t h e  t a r g e t s  
of l a r g e - s c a l e  r e g i o n a l  development e f f o r t s .  I t  was h e r e  t h a t  
t h e  s i x t e e n  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and f i v e  S p e c i a l  Areas were 
d e s i g n a t e d  i n  e f f o r t s  t o  f u r t h e r  d e c o n c e n t r a t e  t h e  major  c i t i e s  
and t o  a t t r a c t  i n d u s t r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  stem t h e  f low o f  m ig ra t i on  
away from a g r i c u l t u r a l  land.  These t h r e e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  a r ea -  
s p e c i f i c  programs were aimed a t  t h e  goa l  o f  f u r t h e r i n g  economic 
growth by more e f f i c i e n t l y  u s ing  l a n d  i n  a  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  manner. 
The f i n a l  s t a g e  i n  postwar r e g i o n a l  p l ann ing  occu r r ed  be- 
g inn ing  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and mani fes ted  i t s e l f  i n  p a r t  a s  t o  
a  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  h igh  growth o f  t h e  1960s,  t o  environmenta l  
d i s r u p t i o n  and t o  h igh  and r i s i n g  l a n d  p r i c e s .  The g o a l s  of  
31~mong  t h e  "push" f a c t o r  which r e s t r i c t  development i n  
l a r g e  c i t i e s  were p r o h i b i t i o n s  of  f a c t o r i e s  r h i c h  u s e  more t h a n  2 500 m o r  s c h o o l s  whlch u se  more t han  150G m of  l and .  According 
t o  many government o f f i c i a l s  t h e s e  p r o h i b i t i o n s  have n o t  been . 
s t r i c t l y  enforced .  
t h i s  p e r i o d  w e r e  t o  have more e f f e c t i v e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of  l a n d  and 
b e t t e r  l a n d  p l a n n i n g ,  a  more comfor tab le  envi ronment ,  t h e  pro-  
motion of s m a l l  c i t i e s ,  a  more e f f e c t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  
overhead c a p i t a l ,  a  b e t t e r  b a l a n c e  between l a r g e  c i t i e s  and 
s m a l l  c i t i e s  on an  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  b a s i s ,  b e t t e r  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  sys tems ,  an  emphasis  on "knowledge- in tens ive"  
i n d u s t r i e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  heavy and c h e m i c a l . i n d u s t r i e s ,  and t h e  
promotion o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p a r k s .  T h i s  e r a  began w i t h  t h e  1969 
New Comprehensive N a t i o n a l  Development P l a n  which s o u g h t  t o  
d e v e l o p  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  t o  1985. The 1969 P l a n  was n e c e s s a r y  
because  o f  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  1962 P l a n  ( i . e . ,  t h e  CNDP) and re- 
l a t e d  measures t o  c a r r y  o u t  r e g i o n a l  development i n  t h e  f a c e  
o f  c o n t i n u e d  r a p i d  economic growth. The key problems o f  t h e  
e a r l y  1960s--overcrowdedness and s p a r s e l y - p o p u l a t e d  r u r a l  a r e a s - -  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  p laque  Japanese  p l a n n e r s  and Japanese  s o c i e t y .  
Also ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  of  c i t i z e n s  f o r c e d  
p l a n n e r s  t o  pay more a t t e n t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r m a l l y ,  t o  c i t i z e n s  
p r e f e r e n c e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  env i ronmenta l  c o n s e r v a t i o n ,  p o l l u -  
t i o n  and c o n g e s t i o n .  
The 1969 P l a n  d i v i d e d  Japan  i n t o  seven major  r e g i o n s  32 . 
w i t h  emphasis  on l a r g e  s c a l e  p r o j e c t s  and e x t e n s i o n s  o f  t h e  
n o d a l  development  e f f o r t s  o f  e a r l i e r  p e r i o d s .  There was an 
e f f o r t  t o  have more comprehensive p l a n n i n g  and t o  s y n t h e s i z e  
t h e  o v e r a l l  development o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  economy. Here t h e r e  
were a t t e m p t s  t o  i n t e g r a t e  c e n t r a l  management f u n c t i o n s  o f  
government and i n d u s t r y ,  t o  e s t a b l i s h  b e t t e r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
sys tems f o r  p r o v i n c i a l  r e g i o n s ,  t o  d e c e n t r a l i z e  f o o t l o o s e  
i n d u s t r i e s  and t o  improve m e t r o p o l i t a n  r e g i o n  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
sys tems .  The most n o t a b l e  impact  o f  t h e  1969 P lan  was t o  p l a c e  
a  s t r o n g  emphasis  on communications and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  sys tems;  
t h i s  i n v o l v e d  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  high-speed t r u n k  r a i l r o a d s  
( such  a s  t h e  e x t e n s i o n s  of t h e  Sh inkansen) ,  highways, t e l e p h o n e  
sys tems and t u n n e l s .  Fur the rmore ,  t h e  N e w  Comprehensive 
N a t i o n a l  Development P l a n  aimed a t  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  e n t i r e l y  
new c i t i e s ;  t h i s  i s  i n  d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  t h e  1962 p l a n  i n  which 
3 2 ~ h e  r e g i o n s  w e r e  Hokkaido, Tohoku, t h e  c a p i t a l  r e g i o n ,  
Chubu, Kink i ,  Chu-Shikoku, and Kyushu. 
e x i s t i n g  c i t i e s  w e r e  used.  
The 1969 P l an  was fo l lowed i n  a  n o n - l e q i s l a t i v e  way i n  
1972 by t h e  s o - c a l l e d  Tanaka p l a n  (Tanaka [I9721 ) . The Tanaka 
p l a n ,  set  f o r t h  d u r i n g  Kakuei Tanaka 's  campaign f o r  t h e  Prime 
M i n i s t e r ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  con t a ine d  s e v e r a l  e l ements  f o r  changing 
t h e  shape of t h e  Japanese  a r c h i p e l a g o  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  r e g i o n a l  
development.  F i r s t ,  Tanaka env i s ioned  t h e  development o f  much 
l a r g e r  super -express  t r a i n  and highway networks.  Second, 
Tanaka proposed a  l a r g e  amount o f  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l o c a t i o n  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  t h e  problems o f  overcrowding i n  t h e  major  c i t i e s  
and w i t h  t h e  under 'popula t ion  o f  some o f  t h e  l o c a l  a r e a s .  H i s  
p l a n  was t o  r e l o c a t e  i n d u s t r i e s  from m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s  t o  
t h o s e  i n  a r e a s  w i t h  low d e n s i t y  o f  development.  There would be 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  t a x  exemptions f o r  r e l o c a t i n g  i n d u s t r y  from con- 
g e s t e d  t o  non-congested a r e a s .  Th i rd ,  it was proposed t h a t  
t h e r e  would be l a r g e - s c a l e  development f o r  c i t i e s  w i t h  popu- 
l a t i o n  o f  approx imate ly  250,000 persons .  These w e r e  growth 
p o l e s  i n  t h e  s p i r i t  of  t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  of  t h e  1960s. 
Th i s  p l a n  was n ev e r  implemented, b u t  it d i d  have a  s u b s t a n t i a l  
impact  on l a n d  v a l u e s  i n  c i t i e s  which w e r e  d e s i g n a t e d  f o r  
r a p i d  growth. 33 
I n  an e f f o r t  t o  come t o  g r i p s  w i th  t h e  problem of  s low 
growth and r a p i d l y  r i s i n g  l a n d  p r i c e s ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Land U s e  
Plann ing  Act was passed  i n  1974. The N a t i o n a l  Land U s e  Plan- 
n i n g  Act i n s t i t u t e d  t h e  N a t i ona l  Land Agency which was orga-  
n i z e d  t o  a d m i n i s t e r  o v e r a l l  l a n d  u s e  p o l i c y  f o r  Japan and 
c o n s i s t e d  o f  e lements  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  government bureaucracy  
fo rmer ly  i n  t h e  Economic P lann ing  Agency and e l sewhere ;  see 
Japan N a t i o n a l  Land Agency [1974, 19751 . The NLA was e m -  
powered t o  t a k e  an a c t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i n v o l v i n g  
l a n d  and w i t h  implementing r e g i o n a l  development p o l i c i e s  under  
3 3 ~ o r  example i n  Tsuyama i n  Okayama p r e f e c t u r e ,  one of 
t h e  c i t i e s  d e s i g n a t e d  f a r  development uader  t h e  Tanaka p l a n  
t h e  l a n d  c o s t  i n  t h e  c e n t r a l  a r e a  o f  t h e  c i t y  went from about  
$ 0.65 p e r  s q u a r e  f o o t  t o  n e a r l y  $ 28.00 p e r  s q u a r e  f o o t  wi th -  
i n  two y e a r s  f o l l o w in g  t h e  announcement of Tanaka ' s  p l a n .  
both t h e  CNLDL and t h e  Nat ional  Land U t i l i z a t i o n  Law of 1 9 7 4 .  
Here t h e  NLA under takes  measures t o  t r y  t o  develop t h e  poor ly  
developed r eg ions  i n  Japan through i n t e g r a t e d  p lanning  and t o  
d i s p e r s e  development which has  a l r eady  taken p l ace  i n  and 
' 3 4 
around t h e  t h r e e  major c i t i e s .  
3.3.1 Trends i n  C e n t r a l  Government Pub l i c  Investment 
A s  i n  our  d i s c u s s i o n  of n a t i o n a l  p lanning i n ' s e c t i o n  2 ,  
t h e  p lanning  process  and planning mechanisms were h e a v i l y  i n -  
f luenced  by t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m i n i s t r i e s  w i th in  
t h e  n a t i o n a l  government. Although t h e  r e g i o n a l  p l a n s ,  however 
vague, c a l l e d  f o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  amounts of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of 
p u b l i c  investment w i t h i n  t h e  Japanese urban system, t h e  a c t u a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  investment continued t o  be 
r e l a t i v e l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  u n t i l  t h e  l a t e  1960s. ~ h e s e  p a t t e r n s  
i n d i c a t e  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of p u b l i c  investments  by major r eg ions  
a s  can be seen i n  Tables 4 and 5.  
I n  Table 4 ,  we s e e  t o t a l  p u b l i c  investment  f o r  each of t h e  
major r eg ions  and observe t h a t ,  i n  1958, t h e  c o a s t a l  p a r t  of  t h e  
Tokyo met ropol i t an  reg ion  (Coas ta l  Kanto) had 19.3 pe rcen t  of 
t o t a l  p u b l i c  investment by t h e  c e n t r a l  government i n  t h a t  year .  
This  p ropor t ion  inc reased  du r ing  t h e  1960s, reach ing  
a  maximum of  2 4 . 4  pe rcen t  i n  1970, before  d e c l i n i n g  between 
1970 and 1973. S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  Osaka region (Coas t a l  K i n k i ) ,  
i nc reased  i t s  s h a r e  of  t o t a l  p u b l i c  investment from 11.9 pe rcen t  
t o  15.1 pe rcen t  i n  1965; t h e  sha re  going t o  t h e  Nagoya (Tokai)  
reg ion  a l s o  i nc reased  between 1958 and 1960 al though it has  
dec l ined  s i n c e  then.  Ove ra l l  t hen ,  t h e  s h a r e  going t o  t h e  
major met ropol i t an  r eg ions  i nc reased  from 44.0 pe rcen t  of  t o t a l  
p u b l i c  investment i n  1958 t o  a  maximum of 50.2 pe rcen t  i n  1965 
be fo re  d e c l i n i n g  t o  46.7 pe rcen t  i n  1 9 7 3 ; ~ ~  t h e  pec iphe ra l  (sub- 
urban) r eg ions  i nc reased  t h e i r  s h a r e  s l i g h t l y  ove r  t h e  pe r iod  
s o  t h a t  t h e  non-metropoli tan,  non-suburban c i t i e s - - t h o s e  which 
- 
3 4 ~ e e  Japan Nat iona l  Land Agency (1975a1 . 
3 5 ~ i y a s a w a  [ I  977 I has  d i scussed  t h i s  p o i n t  a s  w e l l .  
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were supposed t o  be r e c e i v i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  more inves tment  
through t h e  v a r i o u s  p l ann ing  programms--had an a c t u a l  d e c l i n e  
i n  t o t a l  p u b l i c  inves tment  from 45.6 p e r c e n t  (1958) 
t o  42.3 p e r c e n t  (1973) .  
Table  5  shows p u b l i c  inves tment  by t h e  c e n t r a l  government 
on a  p e r  c a p i t a  b a s i s  by r e g i o n  and f o r  t ype  o f  inves tment .  
Once a g a i n ,  w e  see t h a t  t h e  major m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s ,  a t  l e a s t  
through t h e  end o f  1960s,  w e r e  s t i l l  g e t t i n g  more p u b l i c  i n -  
ves tment  p e r  c a p i t a  t han  many of  t h e  poo re r  r e g i o n s ,  a l though  
t h e  gap was narrowing.  Except ions  a r e  t h e  c a s e s  o f  Hokkaido and 
Shikoku which showed i n c r e a s i n g  s h a r e s  of  p e r  c a p i t a  p u b l i c  
inves tment  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d .  For i n d u s t r y - r e l a t e d  inves tment  
p e r  c a p i t a ,  t h e  p i c t u r e  i s  one i n  which t h e r e  i s  a  r e l a t i v e  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  amounts going t o  non-metropol i tan  r eg ions .  
Thus, Tohoku i n c r e a s e d  i t s  index  ( t h e  Japan average  was 100.0)  
o f  p e r  c a p i t a  p u b l i c  inves tment  f o r  i n d u s t r y  from 0.98 (1959- 
1961) t o  1.36 (1973) and Shikoku went from 0.91 t o  1.08 ove r  
t h e  same t i m e  span.  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  C o a s t a l  Tokyo went from 
1.07 t o  0.63; however, t h e  move towards s u b u r b a n i z a t i o n  a s  shown 
i n  t h e  d a t a  f o r  I n l a n d  Kanto (suburban Tokyo) where t h e  i ndex  
went from 0.62 t o  1.08. L i f e - r e l a t e d  ( i . e . ,  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e )  
inves tment  c o n t i n u e s  t o  be concen t r a t ed  i n  t h e  major  met ropo l i -  
t a n  a r e a s  such a s  Tokyo (1.36 index  i n  1973) and Osaka (1.30 
index  i n  1973) .  The o t h e r  r eg ions  seemed t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  
n e g l e c t e d  i n  t e r m s  of l i f e - r e l a t e d  p u b l i c  inves tment .  
. .  
O v e r a l l  t h e n ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  p u b l i c  inves tment  by r eg ion  
c o n t i n u e s  t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  concen t r a t ed  i n  t h e  major  me t ropo l i -  
t a n  a r e a s ,  a l t hough  less s o  t han  i n  t h e  1950s. During t h e  
p e r i o d  o f  major  economic growth ( t h e  1960s)  inves tment  was 
h i g h l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  more c e n t r a l  r e g i o n s  d e s p i t e  
p u b l i c  r h e t o r i c  which i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  p u b l i c  inves tment  shou ld  
and would be d e c e n t r a l i z e d .  Not u n t i l  t h e  l a t e  1960s and e a r l y  
1970s d i d  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  p u b l i c  inves tment  change s p a t i a l l y .  
Then, t h e r e  was a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  amount o f  inves tment  i n  non- 
m e t r o p o l i t a n  r e g i o n s ,  most o f  it i n d u s t r y - r e l a t e d .  

3.3.2 The N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  Areas Proarams 
. - 
N a t u r e  o f  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  A r e a s :  i n  t h i s  
s e c t i o n  w e  rev iew two r e l a t e d  r e g i o n a l  development programs which 
w e r e  3.evised i n  t h e  e a r l y  1960s: t h e  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  
and S p e c i a l  Areas .  Both w e r e  aimed a t  s o l v i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
r e g i o n a l  problems of t h a t  e r a  and w e r e  implemented under  t h e  
1962 N a t i o n a l  Comprehensive Development P l a n .  
The N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  C o n s t r u c t i o n  E x p e d i t i n g  A c t  was 
p a s s e d  i n  1962 and 13 a r e a s  w e r e  d e s i g n a t e d 3 6  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  y e a r ;  
two more r e g i o n s  w e r e  added l a t e r  (see F i g u r e  1  f o r  t h e  l o c a -  
t i o n  o f  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s ) .  The purpose  o f  t h e  A c t  was t o  
a l l e v i a t e  o v e r c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  and i n d u s t r y  i n  t h e  
m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s  and t o  i n c r e a s e  employment i n  s m a l l e r  a r e a s .  
The i d e a  was t o  promote new l o c a l  c i t i e s  a s  t h e  development 
c o r e s  of  r e g i o n s  and t o  have a  ba lanced  u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  economic 
development .  T a r g e t s  w e r e  set  f o r  e a c h  n o d a l  c i t y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  i n d u s t r i a l  development ,  l a b o r  s u p p l y  and demand, and o t h e r  
e l ements  s u c h  a s  l a n d  u s e  and t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
f a c i l i t i e s .  The t a r g e t  y e a r s  o f  t h e  P l a n  w e r e  1975 f o r  indus -  
t r i a l  development  and 1980 f o r  p o p u l a t i o n .  P r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  
law a l lowed  f o r  s p e c i a l l y - f i n a n c e d  l o a n s  and g r a n t s  t o  l o c a l  
governments  f o r  p u b l i c  f a c i l i t i e s ,  hous ing ,  h a r b o r s  and 
r e l a t e d  f a c i l i t i e s ;  t h e s e  c o n s i s t e d  o f  l o w - i n t e r e s t  l o a n s  t o  
l o c a l  governments  f o r  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  e x t e n s i o n s  and p r e f e c t u r a l  
l o w - i n t e r e s t  l o a n s  f o r  s i m i l a r  t y p e s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  There 
were p r o v i s i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Comprehensive 
Development P l a n  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  a c t i ' v i t i e s  o f  s e v e r a l  
m i n i s t r i e s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s .  I n  t h e  
N I C s  i n  Hokkaido and Tohoku t h e r e  were s p e c i a l  development 
3 6 ~ a c h  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y  i n  f a c t  c o n s i s t e d  o f  s e v e r a l  
c i t i e s , t o w n s  and v i l l a g e s  w i t h i n  a  r e g i o n .  I n  a l l ,  t h e r e  w e r e  
94 c i t i e s  and 288 towns and v i l l a g e s  d e s i g n a t e d  under t h i s  a c t .  
T h e r e f o r e  t h e s e  were n o t  "new towns" i n  t h e  commonly unders tood  
meaning o f  t h e  t e r m ,  b u t  c l u s t e r s  o f  e x i s t i n g  m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
Al though t h e r e  was a d e l i c a t e  p o l i t i c a l  compromise i n  t h e  se- 
l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  15 c i t i e s ,  s e v e r a l  c r i t e r i a  w e r e  used i n  se- 
l e c t i n g  them. Among them, t h e  c i t y - r e g i o n  had t o  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  
undeveloped,  and second ,  t h e  N I C  had t o  have some e s t a b l i s h e d  i n -  
f r a s t r u c t u r e  and c o n s i d e r a b l e  a v a i l a b l e  l a n d  and w a t e r .  
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Figure 1 
The New lndustrial Cities and the Special Areas for 
Industrial Development 
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l o a n s  a s  w e l l .  The p l a n n i n g  f o r  t h e  N I C s  was a l s o  p a r t l y  under  
s u p e r v i s i o n  of  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r y  th rough  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  I n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  Trade and I n d u s t r y ,  w i t h  s u p e r v i s o r y  committees f o r  
e a c h  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y .  
The o t h e r  major  growth-pole law was t h e  S p e c i a l  Areas 
f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  C o n s o l i d a t i o n  E x p e d i t i n g  A c t  o f  1964. S i x  
S p e c i a l  Areas  (see F i g u r e  1 )  w e r e  d e s i g n a t e d  under  t h i s  
a c t ,  most o f  them i n  t h e  P a c i f i c  B e l t  between t h e  major  metro- 
p o l i t a n  a r e a s .  These S p e c i a l  Areas  (SAs) c o u l d  be  used t o  
l o c a t e  i n d u s t r y  which was d e c e n t r a l i z i n g  from c o r e s  o f  t h e  
major  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  o v e r a l l  economic 
e f f i e n c y .  A s  w i t h  t h e  N I C s ,  t h e  SAs had t a r g e t s  f o r  t h e  con- 
s o l i d a t i o n  of  f a c t o r i e s ,  f o r  t h e  s i z e  of  a  p o p u l a t i o n  and i n -  
d u s t r i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  p l a n s .  
P u b l i c  I n v e s t m e n t  P a t t e r n s  i n  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and 
S p e c i a l  A r e a s :  given  t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  of t h e  N I C s  and SAs i n  
t h e  e a r l y  1960s,  what was t h e  p a t t e r n  of  p u b l i c  inves tment  i n  
t h e s e  r e g i o n s  and what was t h e  r e s u l t i n q  r a t e  of  economic 
and s o c i a l  development? Inves tment  p l a n s  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  1965 
c a l l e d  f o r  approx imate ly  4,655 t r i l l i o n  yen - ( a b o u t  $ 15.5 
b i l l i o n )  i n  i n v e s t m e n t s  f o r  t h e  N I C s  and 2,118 t r i l l i o n  
yen - ( a b o u t  $ 7.1 b i l l i o n )  f o r  t h e  SAs between 1965 and 1975. 
The a c t u a l  cumula t ive  inves tment  t o  1974 f o r  t h e  N I C s  was 
5,959 b i l l i o n  yen - and 2,644 t r i l l i o n  yen f o r  t h e  SAs. A s  
-
shown i n  Tab le  6 ,  t h e  N I C s  and SAs accomplished 128.0 and 
106.1 p e r c e n t  o f  t h e i r  p l a n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  However, when one 
a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n f l a t i o n  which o c c u r r e d  between 
1965 and 1975, and measures inves tment  i n  r e a l  t e r m s ,  it i s  
shown t h a t  t h e  N I C s  ach ieved  o n l y  92.1 p e r c e n t  o f  p lanned i n -  
ves tment  by 1974 and t h e  SAs o n l y  76.6 p e r c e n t  o f  i n v e s t m e n t .  
Fur the rmore ,  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  Do-ou, Sendai-wan and 
N i i g a t a ,  none of  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  N I C s  o r  SAs a c h i e v e d  p lanned 
i n v e s t m e n t  t a r g e t s .  Some, such a s  Toyo (56.8  p e r c e n t  o f  
p lanned i n v e s t m e n t )  and Shunan (56.6 p e r c e n t )  showed r e l a t i v e l y  
l i t t l e  accomplishment o f  p lanned  g o a l s .  
Table 6  
Planned and Actual Public Investment in New Industrial Cities and Special Areas 1965 -1974  
(real figures in 1965  billions of yen) 
Amount of the basic plan 1 9 7 4  Cummulative Percent achievement! 
Total of the basic plan 
Current Real value Current Real value Current Real value 
value value value 
New Industrial Cities 
DO-ou 
Hochinohe 
Sendai-wan 
Akita-wan 
Joban Koriyam 
Niigata 
Matsumoto-Suwa 
Toyama-Takooka 
Nakonoumi 
Okayama Kennan 
Tokushima 
Toyo 
Oita 
Hyuga Nobeoka 
Shiranui-Ariake-Omuta 
Total 
Special Areas 
Kashima 189  1 9 9  258  1 9 4  136 9  7  
Higashi-suruga wan 377 397 3 0 3  2 3 8  80  6 0  
Higashi-mikawa 286  30 1  280  2 1 3  9 8  7  1  
Harima 688  7 2 4  812  6 0 9  118  84  
Bingo 331  349 406  307 1 2 3  8  8  
Shunan 2 4 7  260  1 8 9  1 4 7  77 5 7  
Total 2,118 2,230 2,248 1,709 106  77  
Source: Japan National Land Agency [ 1 9 7 5 b ]  
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  planned l e v e l  i n v e s t -  
ment by a u t h o r i t i e s  was n o t  reached,  it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  i f  one 
looks  a t  p u b l i c  investment p e r  c a p i t a  f o r  t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  
C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  Areas t h a t  J apan ' s  l ack  of a  fundamental 
i n d u s t r i a l  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  po l i cy  becomes even more c l e a r .  
I n  Table 7  we see  an index of p u b l i c  investment p e r  c a p i t a  
f o r  a l l  of  t h e  N I C s  and SAs a s  we l l  a s  f o r  t h e  major reg ions  
i n  Japan f o r  1965, 1970 and 1973. This  index ( t h e  average pe r  
c a p i t a  l e v e l  f o r  Japan i s  100.0) shows t h e  l e v e l  of p e r  c a p i t a  
investment f o r  a l l  t h e  NIcs f o r  1965 was 81.0, i n c r e a s i n g  
t o  93.5 by 1973; f o r  t h e  Spec i a l  Areas,  t h e  index 
went from 71.0 t o  89.2. This means t h a t  even though t h e  
c e n t r a l  government claimed t h a t  it was i n v e s t i n g  h e a v i l y  i n  
t h e s e  underdeveloped a r e a s ,  t h e  per  c a p i t a  investment  index 
shows t h a t  t h i s  i s  not  t h e  case :  l e v e l s  of p u b l i c  investment  
p e r  c a p i t a  were much lower i n  t h e  N I C s  and SAs than  i n  a l l  of 
Japan.  Furthermore, i f  one compares i n d i v i d u a l  N I C s  and SAs 
wi th  t h e  major r eg ions  i n  which they  a r e  l o c a t e d ,  one s e e s  t h a t  
t h e  l e v e l  of p u b l i c  investment p e r  c a p i t a  i n  t h e  N I C s  i s  even, 
lower than  i n  t h e  l a r g e r  reg ions  i n  most ca ses .  For i n s t a n c e ,  
a l l  f i v e  N I C s  i n  Tohoku have indexes f o r  1973 w e l l  below t h e  
average f o r  t h a t  region.  
P o p u l a t i o n  an'd O u t p u t  G r o w t h :  t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  
f a i l e d  t o  achieve t h e i r  t a r g e t  l e v e l s  of popula t ion  growth 
a s  shown i n  Table 8. I t  was planned t o  have 12.3 m i l l i o n  
people  i n  1970 and 13.4 m i l l i o n  people i n  1975 w i t h i n  t h e  
N I C s .  However, according t o  a v a i l a b l e  data3'  t h e  popula t ion  
of t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  reached only 11.2 m i l l i o n  people 
i n  1970 and 11.8 m i l l i o n  people i n  1975, o r  89.9 pe rcen t  and 
88.0 pe rcen t  of planned popula t ion  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  None of t h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  N I C s  achieved t h e i r  planned growth by 1975, on ly  a  
few of t h e  N I C s ,  (Sendai-wan, Do-ou and Nakanoumi) coming c l o s e .  
Many o t h e r s  lagged s i g n i f i c a n t l y  from planned t o t a l s ,  however. 
37 
See sources  t o  Table 8 .  
Table 7 
Public Investment Index Per Capita By Major Regions, 
New Industrial Cities and Special Areas 
1965 1970 1973 
All Japan 100.0 100.0 100.0 
- 
Hokkaido 
Tohoku 
Kanto (Inland) 
Kanto (Coastal) 
Tokai 
Hokuriku 
Kinki (Inland) 
Kinki (Coastal) 
Chugoku 
Shikoku 
Kyushu 
New Industrial Cities 
a DO-ou b Hachinohe 
Sendai wan 
Akitawanb 
Joban Koriyama 
~iigatab 
C Matsumoto Suwad 
Toyama-Takaoka 
Nakanoumie 
Okayama-minami 
Tokushimaf 
Toyof 
Oitag 
~ ~ u g a - ~ o b e o k a ~  
~hiranui-~riake' 
All New Industrial Cities 
Special Areas 
  as hi ma' 
Higashi-surugahwan h 
Higashi-mikawa 
~arimai 
Bingoe 
shunane 
All S.A. 
Source: Japan Economic Planning Agency [I9751 and Japan National 
Land Agency [ 1975333 . 
. . 
a Hokkaido region f~hikoku region 
b~ohoku region g~yushu region 
C Inland Kanto h~okai region 
d~okuriku region i Inland Kinki region 
e Chugoku region 
Table 8 
planned and Actual Population of New Industrial Cities, 
Actual Population Planned Population 
New Industrial Cities 1960 1965 1970 1975 1970 1975 
DO-OU 
Hachinohe 
Sendai-wan 
Akita-wan 
Joban-Koriyama 
Niigata 
Matsumoto-Suwa 
Toyama-Takaoka 
Nakanoumi 
Okayama-minami 
Tokushima 
Toyo 
Oita 
Hyuga-Nobeoka 
Shiranui-Ariake- 
Omuta 
Total 
Source: Japanese Population Census for 1960, 1965, 1970 and 
1975, and Japan Ministry of Home Affairs [1975bl and 
Japan National Land Agency [ 19751 . 
I n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  n a t i o n ,  t h e  s h a r e  of popula t ion  i n  t h e  New 
I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  i nc reased  by only 0.1 pe rcen t  between 1965 
and 1975 and, t h e r e f o r e ,  no c l e a r  t r e n d  towards d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  
towards New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  from o t h e r  r eg ions  can be observed.  
Furthermore,  i n t e r e s t i n g  p a t t e r n s  can be seen i n  t h e  s p a t i a l  
development w i t h i n  t h e  N I C s .  Our d a t a  ( s e e  Table 9 )  i n d i c a t e  
t h a t  of t h e  popula t ion  growth which d i d  occur  w i th in  t h e  N I C s ,  
7 7 . 1  pe rcen t  took p l a c e  w i th in  t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s .  The N I C s '  r u r a l  
p o r t i o n s  e i t h e r  had l i t t l e  popula t ion  growth o r  dec l ined  ab- 
s o l u t e l y .  The l a t t e r  i s  t h e  ca se  i n  Akita-wan, Joban-Koriyama 
and Chukai. ~ h u s ,  i n  some c a s e s ,  depopulat ion of nearby a r e a s  
occur red  w i t h i n  t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s .  I t  can a l s o  be 
shown t h a t  t h e  N I C s  o f t e n  grew more slowly than most of t h e  
c i t i e s  i n  Table 10  where comparisons a r e  made between 1970-1975 
popula t ion  growth of t h e  N I C s ,  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e s  i n  which they  
a r e  l o c a t e d ,  and a l l  c i t i e s  i n  t hose  p r e f e c t u r e s .  Although 
t h e  N I C s  grew f a s t e r  than t h e i r  predominantely r u r a l  p r e f e c t u r e s  
i n  most c a s e s ,  i n  seven of t h e  f i f t e e n  N I C s  t h e r e  was f a s t e r  
growth among t h e  o t h e r  c i t i e s  i n  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e s .  
Another ques t ion  which we i n v e s t i g a t e d  was whether o r  n o t  
t h e  N I C  c i t i e s  were growing f a s t e r  than  o t h e r  c i t i e s  of s i m i l a r  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which were n o t  spec i a l l y -des igna t ed  f o r  deve- 
lopment. I t  could be argued,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  s i n c e  p u b l i c  
- 
investment was n o t  heav i ly  concent ra ted  i n  t h e  N I C s ,  t h a t  t h e r e  
would be no p a r t i c u l a r  reason f o r  them t o  grow f a s t e r  than  
o t h e r  c i t i e s .  We t h u s  s e l e c t e d  1 9  c i t i e s  of  s i m i l a r  s i z e  
and popula t ion  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t o  t h e  N I C s  and compared t h e  
sample c i t i e s  wi th  t h e  N I C  core  c i t i e s  f o r  1960 t o  1975. The 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  used f o r  s e l e c t i n g  t h e  c i t i e s  t o  he p a i r e d  wi th  
t h e  N I C s  were a s  fol lows:  ( 1 )  t h e  s e l e c t e d  c i t i e s  should have 
popula t ion  s i z e s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  N I C  core  c i t i e s ;  ( 2 )  t h e  c i t i e s  
should be i n  t h e  same p r e f e c t u r e  o r  same major region a s  t h e  
N I C  ( t h i s  would h e l p  us s e l e c t  c i t i e s  wi th  s i m i l a r  socio-eco- 
nomic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) ;  (3 )  t h e  compared c i t i e s  should have 
s i m i l a r  acces s  t o  major markets a s  measured by d i s t a n c e  and 
t r a v e l  t i m e  t o  Tokyo o r  Osaka; and ( 4 )  t h e  c i t i e s  should have 
T a b l e  9 
P o p u l a t i o n  Growth o f  Major C i t i e s  w i t h i n  
N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s ,  1965-1975 
I n c r e a s e  i n  Popula-  
t i o n ,  1965-1975 (000)  P e r c e n t a g e  1x1- 
crease o f  Popu- 
- 
N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  Major N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  Major l a t i o n  Accounted 
C i t y  C i t y  C i t y  C i t y  f o r  by  Major  C i t y  
Do-ou Sapporo  
Hachinohe Hachinohe 
Sendai-wan S e n d a i  
Akita-wan A k i t a  
Joban-Koriyama Iwak i  a n d  
Koriyama 
N i i g a t a  N i i g a t a  
Matsumoto-Suwa Matsumoto 
Toyama-Takaoka Toyama 
Okayama-minami Okayama 
Tokushima Tokushima 
Toyo Niihama 
O i t a  O i t a  
Hyuga-Nobeoka Nobeoka 
S h i r a n u i - A r i a k e -  Kumamoto 
Omuta 
Chukai  Yonago and  
Matsue 
A l l  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  
C i t i e s  
Source :  J a p a n e s e  P o p u l a t i o n  Census f o r  1965, 1970 and 1975.  
T a b l e  10  
Comparison o f  P o p u l a t i o n  Growth Rates between 
N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and t h e i r  P r e f e c t u r e s ,  
1970 -1  3 7 5  
P e r c e n t  
N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t y  Change 
Doou 
Hachinohe 
Sendai-wan 
A k i t a  wan 
Joban Koriyama 
N i i g a t a  
Matsumato Suwa 
Toyama-Tokaoka 
Chukai  
Okayama Kennan 
Tokushima 
Toyo 
O i t a  
Hyuga Nobeoka 
Sh i ronuh i -Ar iake  
16.8  
5.8 
10 .7  
7.5 
0 .9  
6.2 
5 .3  
5.1 
4 .1  
12.9 
6 .5  
3.8 
13 .3  
4.6 
and Omuta 2.3 
P r e f e c t u r e  
Hokkaido 
Aomori 
Miyagi  
A k i t a  
Fukushima 
N i i g a t a  
Nagano 
Toyama 
T o t t o r i  and Shimane 
Okayama 
Tokushima 
Ehime 
O i t a  
Miyazaki  
Fukuoka and Kumamoto 
P e r c e n t  Change 
C i t i e s  i n  E n t i r e  
P r e f e c t u r e  P r e f e c t u r e  
s i m i l a r  h i s t o r i c a l  and c u l t u r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  38 The r e s u l t s  
of  o u r  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  g i v e n  i n  Tab le  11 where t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of  comparisons of  growth r a t e s  between p a i r s  of  c i t i e s  i s  t a b u -  
l a t e d .  Although t h e  N I C s  showed more r a p i d  growth i n  t h e  1965- 
1970 p e r i o d  ( i n  11 of 19 compar i sons ) ,  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e .  
Between 1970 and 1975 t h e  N I C s  grew f a s t e r  t h a n  t h e i r  compara t ive  
p a i r  i n  o n l y  8  c a s e s .  The o t h e r  c i t i e s  grew f a s t e r  i n  8  c a s e s  
and l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  c o u l d  be  seen  i n  t h e  remainina  3. S i n c e  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  p u b l i c  inves tment  program shou ld  b e  f e l t  w i t h  
some l a g ,  w e  would have assumed t h a t ,  i f  t h e  N I C  program w e r e  
e f f e c t i v e ,  N I C  r e l a t i v e  growth r a t e s  would b e  g r e a t e r  d u r i n g  
t h e  l a t e r  p e r i o d .  T h i s  was n o t  t h e  c a s e .  I n  sum, o u r  e v i d e n c e  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  N I C s  d i d  n o t  grow any f a s t e r  t h a n  c i t ies  of  
s i m i l a r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  between 1965 and 1975. 
Tab le  12 shows t h e  growth of o u t p u t  of  t h e  N I C s  s i n c e  t h e i r  
i n c e p t i o n .  I n d u s t r i a l  sh ipments  grew from abou t  23.9 b i l l i o n  
yen t o  122.5 b i l l i o n  yen between 1965 and 1974, 17.8 p e r c e n t  
- -
p e r  y e a r ;  t h e  SAs growth r a t e  was 18.0 p e r c e n t .  T h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  
a  f a s t e r  r a t e  of growth t h a n  t h e  average  f o r  Japan (15 .8  pe r -  
c e n t  p e r  y e a r )  and t h e r e f o r e  t h e  s h a r e  of  t h e  N I C s  and SAs de- 
velopment a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  of  Japan  i n c r e a s e d  from 14.1 p e r c e n t  
t o  16.9 p e r c e n t .  39 
Most o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  development i n  t h e  New I n d u s t r i a l  
C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  Areas  was i n  t h e  heavy and chemical  indus -  
t r ies  a s  shown i n  Table  1 3 -  The p e r c e n t a g e  o f  a l l  i n d u s t r i a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  i n  t h o s e  i n d u s t r i e s  was 54.2 p e r c e n t  i n  1960 i n -  
c r e a s i n g  t o  61.6 p e r c e n t  by 1974. During t h a t  same p e r i o d  t h e  
p e r c e n t a g e  of  manufac tu r ing  i n  heavy and chemical  i n d u s t r i e s  f o r  
a l l  o f  Japan  remained r e l a t i v e l y  c o n s t a n t .  Moreover, s i n c e  t h i s  
p r o d u c t i o n  took  p l a c e  i n  h e a v i l y  c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r y ,  
employment i n c r e a s e d  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  re- 
3 8 ~ o r  d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e s e  c i t i e s ,  see ~ a n i f u j i  and 
Nozu [1977] .  
3 9 ~ o w e v e r ,  t h e r e  was a  l a r g e  (unexp la ined)  jump i n  t h i s  
s h a r e  i n  t h e  l a s t  y e a r  of  t h e  p e r i o d ,  1974, which a c c o u n t s  f o r  
a  l a r g e  s h a r e  of t h i s  i n c r e a s e .  
Table 11 
Comparison between Populat ion Growth Rates  of 
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and o t h e r  C i t i e s  of 
S imi l a r  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  1960-1975 
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i ty  
Grew ÿ aster^ 
Non-New I n d u s t r i a l  
C i ty  G r e w    aster^ 
L i t t l e  Di f fe rence  i n  
Growth Rates b  
a  The c i t y  which grew a t  l e a s t  1 pe rcen t  f a s t e r  (over  t h e  
f i v e  yea r  pe r iod )  was considered f a s t e r  growing. 
b ~ e i t h e r  c i t y  grew more than  1  pe rcen t  f a s t e r  than  t h e  
o t h e r .  
Source: T a r i f u j i  and Nozu [1977]. 
T a b l e  12 
S h a r e  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  Sh ipments  of New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  A r e a s  
i n  R e l a t i o n  t o  A l l  J a ~ a n .  1965-1974 
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  P e r c e n t  S h a r e  S p e c i a l  A r e a s  
- o f  New Indus -  
Va lue  of  I n d u s t r i a l  Value  P e r c e n t  Va lue  P e r c e n t  t r i a l  C i t i e s  and 
Shipment  i n  J a p a n  of  Shipments  S h a r e  o f  Sh ipmen t s  S h a r e  S p e c i a l  Areas  
S o u r c e :  J a p a n  N a t i o n a l  Land Agency, [1975b] .  
T a b l e  13 
P e r c e n t  of H e a v y  and C h e m i c a l  I n d u s t r i e s  
i n  A l l  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  f o r  New ~ n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s ,  
Special A r e a s  and A l l  Japan,  1960-1974 
I n d u s t r y  1960 1965 1970 1974 
NEW INDUSTRIAL C I T I E S  
C h e m i c a l  a n d  A l l i e d  17.9% 16.4% 13.3% 12.8% 
P e t r o l e u m  and C o a l  3.2% 5.1% 5.3% 10.2% 
I r o n  and Steel 9.2% 7,596 10.7% 11.3% 
N o n - F e r r o u s  Metals 7.1% 5.7% 6.9% 6.2% 
Machinery 13.2% 14.6% 17.8% 15.9% 
T o t a l  50.5% 49.2% 53.9% 56.4% 
SPECIAL AREAS 
C h e m i c a l  and A l l i e d  12.2% 13.1% 13.7% 12.5% 
P e t r o l e u m  and C o a l  7.4% 4.9% 2.6% 7.2% 
I r o n  a n d  Steel  15.9% 14.9% 19.2% 21.8% 
N o n - F e r r o u s  M e t a l s  2.7% 3.2% 3.4% 2.8% 
Machinery 2 0 . 8% 23.9% 26.8% 23.9% 
T o t a l  59.0% 60.0% 65.8% 68.4% 
NEW INDUSTRIAL C I T I E S  AND SPECIAL AREAS 
C h e m i c a l  and A l l i e d  15.4% 15.0% 13.5% 12.7% 
P e t r o l e u m  and C o a l  5.0% 5.0% 4.1% 8.9% 
I r o n  and S t e e l  12.1% 10.7% 14.4% 15.8% 
N o n - F e r r o u s  Metals 5.2% 4.6% 5.4% 4.7% 
Machinery 16.5% 18.6% 21.8% 19.4% 
T o t a l  54.2% 53.8% 59.1% 61.6% 
ALL JAPAN 
C h e m i c a l  and A l l i e d  N.A. 9.3% 9.2% 9.1% 
P e t r o l e u m  and C o a l  N.A. 2.9% 3.0% 6.0% 
I r o n  and  S t e e l  N.A. 9.5% 10.8% 1.4% 
N o n - F e r r o u s  Metals N.A. 4.1% 4.9% 4.4% 
M a c h i n e r y  N.A. 27.5% 35.3% 33.1% 
T o t a l  N.A. 53.3% 63.2% 54.0% 
S o u r c e :  Japan N a t i o n a l  A g e n c y ,  [I975 
l a t i v e  t o  o u t p u t .  T h i s  i s  one o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  t h a t  p o p u l a t i o n  
d i d  n o t  grow v e r y  q u i c k l y  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y .  
The N I C s  and SAs d i d  n o t  produce new jobs  commensurate w i t h  
t h e i r  o u t p u t  l e v e l s .  The l a c k  of buoyant  employment growth 
was one r e a s o n  f o r  p u b l i c  compla in t s  abou t  t h e s e  programs 
d u r i n g  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  C i t i z e n s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e y  had g a i n e d  
r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  from t h e  N I C -  and SA-re la ted  f a c t o r i e s  i n  
t h e i r  communities.  Problems of  a i r  and w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n  i n  
connec t ion  w i t h  t h e s e  f a c t o r i e s  were a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  
much p u b l i c  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n .  
3 . 4  Summary E v a l u a t i o n  o f  N e w  I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s  and S p e c i a l  
Areas Prourams 
I t  s h o u l d  be c l e a r  from t h i s  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  l i t t l e  i n  t h e  
way o f  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  g o a l s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  r e g i o n a l  
p o l i c y  were m e t  by t h e s e  programs. The c e n t r a l  government h a s  
n o t  had a  s t r o n g  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  p o l i c y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p u b l i c  
inves tment  i n  g e n e r a l  and h a s  n o t  i n v e s t e d  h e a v i l y  i n  t h e s e  
p a r t i c u l a r  c i t y - r e g i o n s  e i t h e r .  P u b l i c  i n v e s t m e n t  d i d  n o t  
r e a c h  p lanned l e v e l s  i n  r e a l  t e r m s  and t h e r e  was less i n v e s t e d  
on a  p e r  c a p i t a  b a s i s  t h e r e  t h a n  t h e  average  f o r  a l l  o f  Japan .  
Low p u b l i c  inves tment  was accompanied by t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  m e e t  
p o p u l a t i o n  g o a l s .  T h i s  was, i n  p a r t ,  due t o  t h e  low employment- 
i n t e n s i t y  o f  i n v e s t m e n t .  Although o u t p u t  i n  t h e  N I C s  and SAs 
i n c r e a s e d  more r a p i d l y  t h a n  f o r  t h e  n a t i o n  a s  a  whole,  it d i d  
n o t  i n c r e a s e  employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  r e g i o n s  away from 
t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  c e n t e r s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  induce  v e r y  much m i -  
s r a t i o n .  
Y e t  some of t h e  N I C s  and SAs d i d  grow s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  What 
w e r e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  s u c c e s s f u l  growth p o l e s ?  An example 
i s  given by Lo [ I 9 7 5 1  i n  h i s  s t u d y  of  Okayama-Kennan whose major  
c i t y  i s  Mizushima. H e  shows t h a t  Mizushima had s e v e r a l  cha rac -  
t e r i s t ics  which made f o r  a  f a v o r a b l e  growth envi ronment .  F i r s t ,  
t h e r e  was c o n s i d e r a b l e  economic development a c t i v i t y  p r i o r  t o  
i t s  d e s i g n a t i o n  a s  a  N I C  which was l o c a l l y - d e t e r m i n e d  and 
p lanned.  Second, t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  government a l lowed . ~ s i g n i f i c a n t  
s u b s i d i e s  t o  new p l a n t s  l o c a t i n g  i n  Mizushima. 40 Third ,  t h e r e  
was t h e  a c t i v e  coopera t ion  of a  few very l a r g e  c o r p o r a t i o n s  who 
wanted t o  l o c a t e  t h e r e  anyway. Fourth ,  t h e r e  was good t r a n s -  
p o r t a t i o n  access  t o  major markets.  These i n g r e d i e n t s  were simply 
no t  p r e s e n t  i n  many of t h e  o t h e r  N I C s  and SAs. 
3.5 Regional Developing Po l i cy  and Changes i n  t h e  I n t e r r e g i o n a l  
D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Popula t ion  and Income 
3.5.1 In t roduc t ion  
We have reviewed Japanese r e g i o n a l  development p o l i c y  and 
seen s e v e r a l  under ly ing  themes, s t r a t e g i e s  and assumptions.  I n  
t h e  mid-1950s many policy-makers concluded t h a t  b i g  c i t i e s  were t o o  
b i g  and t h a t  a  deconcent ra t ion  p o l i c y  was e s s e n t i a l .  Deconcen- 
t r a t i o n  was a l s o  b e n e f i c i a l  wi th  regard  t o  reducing income 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between r i c h  and poor r eg ions .  Therefore  t h e  
p o l i c i e s  we reviewed i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  were p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t :  
growth p o l e s ,  d e c e n t r a l i z e d  p u b l i c  investment ,  r e g u l a t i o n s  con- 
s t r a i n i n g  new f a c t o r i e s  w i th in  Tokyo and o t h e r  l a r g e  c i t i e s .  
I n  t h e  1960s, popula t ion  began t o  d e c e n t r a l i z e  and income d i f -  
f e r e n c i e s  among r eg ions  decreased.  A s i m p l i s t i c  view of t h e s e  
phenomena would hold  t h a t  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  "worked". I n  f a c t ,  
t h i s  may n o t  be t r u e .  Not only  was t h e  p o l i c y  i n e f f e c t i v e ,  bu t  
many of i t s  under lying assumptions might have been wrong. We 
review t h e  assumptions,  t h e  phenomena, and t h e  p o l i c i e s  below. 
4 0  The ques t ion  of proper  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  encourage l o c a t i o n  
of p l a n t s  i s  an impor tan t  one he re .  According t o  an EPA [I9751 
survey ,  t h e  major reasons  f o r  f i rms  l o c a t i n g  i n  N I C s  a r e  a s  
fol lows:  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of land (16.4 p e r c e n t  of t h o s e  i n t e r -  
viewed) , a v a i l a b i l i t y  of l abo r  ( 1  1.5 p e r c e n t )  and c lo seness  t o  
markets (9 .3  p e r c e n t ) .  For  t h e  S A s  20.9 p e r c e n t  considered 
land  a v a i l a b i l i t y  t h e  most important  f a c t o r ,  fol lowed by prox- 
imi ty  t o  r e l a t e d  f a c t o r i e s  ( e i t h e r  owned by t h e  same company 
o r  a  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r )  and nearness  t o  markets.  Tax i n c e n t i v e s ,  
o f t e n  noted a s  important  inducements t o  f i r m s  l o c a t i n g  i n  t h e  
N I C s  and SAs, were r e l a t i v e l y  unimportant  according t o  t h e  
survey:  t h i s  f a c t o r  was r a t e d  t h e  e l even th  most impor tan t  
l o c a t i n g  f a c t o r  among N I C  f i rms  and s i x t e e n t h  among SA companies. 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of Yizushima, however, t h e  s u b s i d i e s  were f a r  more 
than f o r  t h e  average growth pole .  
3.5.2 Some Assumptions Under ly ing Japanese  Regional  
Development P o l i c y  
F i r s t ,  p l a n n e r s  assumed t h a t  c i t i e s  w e r e  too b i g  and needed 
d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  Although,  t h e  Tokyo r e g i o n  h a s  grown t o  i t s  
p r e s e n t  s i z e  of  n e a r l y  25 m i l l i o n  (see Glickman [1977bl i n  what 
s e n s e  can it and o t h e r  r e g i o n s  be  s a i d  t o  be  " t o o  b i g " ?  For  
i n s t a n c e  Kabaya [I9711 a rgues  f o r  b o t h  t h e o r e t i c a l  and e m p i r i c a l  
r e a s o n s  t h a t  Japanese  c i t i e s  may n o t  have been " t o o "  b i g  from 
t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  of  economic e f f i c e n c y .  Kabaya s a y s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  
t h e  costs of  p e r  c a p i t a  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  rise w i t h  c i t y - s i z e ,  
p r o d u c t i o n  p e r  worker  i n c r e a s e s  f a s t e r .  For  1965, Kabaya 
shows t h a t  mean p e r  c a p i t a  income rises smoothly and n e a r l y  
doub les  a s  one goes from t h e  l e a s t  dense  t o  t h e  m o s t  dense  
p r e f e c t u r e .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  c u r v e  showing p e r  c a p i t a  
government e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  U-shaped, b u t  sha l low.    here fore, 
a c c o r d i n g  t o  Kabaya [p .  291, t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between income and 
e x p e n d i t u r e  i n c r e a s e s  " i n  a  c l e a r l y  p r o g r e s s i v e  way w i t h  popu- 
l a t i o n  d e n s i t y . "  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  d e n s e r  p r e f e c t u r e s  a r e  i n  t h i s  
s e n s e  more e f f i c i e n t . /  Although t h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  n o t  conp le -  
t e l y  c o n c l u s i v e ,  t h e y  c e r t a i n l y  q u e s t i o n  t h e  commonly-held view 
t h a t  Japanese  c i t i e s  a r e  t o o  b i g .  
Of c o u r s e  t h e r e  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  n e g a t i v e  e x t e r i a l i t i e s  i n  
t h e  l a r g e  c i t i e s  such a s  p o l l u t i o n  and c o n g e s t i o n  and t h e y  a r e  
a  s o u r c e  of  concern  f o r  p l a n n e r s  antl t h e  p u b l i c .  But t h e  
c i t i e s - a r e - t o o - b i g  argument needs  t o  b e  r e c o n s i d e r e d  on t h e  
grounds of  p o s s i b l e  g r e a t e r  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  l a r g e r  c e n t e r s .  Such 
a  r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n  might  s t i l l  l e a d  a n a l y s t s  t o  s a y  t h a t  Tokyo 
i s  too  b i g ,  b u t  f u r t h e r  s t u d y  o f  t h i s  i s s u e  s h o u l d  be  under-  
t aken .  I t  seems n o t  t o  have been s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r e d  by t h e  
p l a n n e r s  i n  t h e  l a t e  1950s and e a r l y  1960s when d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
~ o l i c i e s  w e r e  begun. 4 1 
A second assumpt ion  i s  t h a t  by d e v e l o p i n g  underdeveloped 
r e g i o n ~ ~ i n t e r r e g i o n a l  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  income 
 his i s s u e  h a s  been h o t l y  d e b a t e d  i n  academic c i r c l g s .  
See f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  exchange between Mera [1973, 19751 and 
Borukhow [1975] .  See a l s o  Alonso [1971] ,  Hl r sch  [19681, 
Neutze [1967] ,  Thompson [ 1 9 6 8 ] ,  and Wingo [1972] .  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  would be  reduced.  That  i s ,  Japanese  p l a n n e r s  
assumed t h a t  " p l a c e "  e q u i t y  ( i . e . ,  t h e  development of  poor 
r e g i o n s  r e l a t i v e  t o  r i c h  r e g i o n s )  impl ied  "peop le"  e q u i t y  
( i . e . ,  r e d u c t i o n s  of  income d i f f e r e n c e s  among i n d i v i d u a l s ) .  
Th i s  assumpt ion i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t r u e  e i t h e r .  For  i f  peop le  
from poor r e g i o n s  a r e  a b l e  t o  m ig ra t e  t o  r i c h e r  r e g i o n s  and 
t he r eb y  b e t t e r  themse lves ,  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  e q u i t y  cou ld  be 
a t t a i n e d  w i t h o u t  any change i n  i n t e r r e g i o n a l ,  i . e . ,  p l a c e ,  
e q u i t y .  Th i s  t o o  has  occu r r ed  i n  postwar Japan a s  Kabaya ha s  
p o i n t e d  o u t .  The r e a l  q u e s t i o n  i s  whether  t h e  development of 
l ag g ing  r e g i o n s  w i l l  be more e f f e c t i v e  i n  h e l p i n g  i t s  r e s i d e n t s  
t ha n  encouraging ou tmig ra t i on  t o  r i c h e r ,  more p roduc t i ve  r e g i o n s .  
The e m p i r i c a l  ev idence  f o r  Japan i s  n o t  c o n c l u s i v e  on t h i s  p o i n t .  
Kabaya [pp.  19-21] shows t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  1960s many l a g g i n g  
r e g i o n s  which had ou tmig ra t i on  a l s o  had h igh  growth r a t e s  of 
p e r  c a p i t a  income and t h a t  p r e f e c t u r e s  w i t h  n e t  i n m i g r a t i o n  had 
lower r a t e s  of income growth; he does  n o t  p o s t u l a t e  a  c a u s a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between mig ra t i on  and r e g i o n a l  income growth, however. 
I n  t h e  s e n s e s  no ted  h e r e ,  it i s  u n c l e a r  t h a t  e i t h e r  of t h e  
major assumpt ions  unde r ly ing  r e g i o n a l  p l ann ing  e f f o r t s  were 
well-founded.  Even i n  t h e  terms of t h e  p l a n n e r s ,  which meant 
emphasis on t h e  promotion of g r e a t e r  economy wide e f f i c i e n c y ,  
encouraging ou tmig ra t i on  t o  more p r o d u c t i v e ,  i . e . ,  d e n s e r ,  
r e g i o n s  might  have made t h e  economy more e f f i c i e n t .  T h i s ,  i n  
t u r n ,  would have p e r m i t t e d  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  e x t r a  income t o  be r e -  
d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  poore r  peop le  producing g r e a t e r  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
e q u i t y .  S o c i a l  cos t s - -bo th  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e x t e r n a l i t i e s  i n  t h e  
b i g  c i t i e s  and t h o s e  of t h e  migrants--would remain b u t  micro- 
economic p o l i c y  cou ld  have been used t o  reduce  t h e  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
e f f e c t s .  Th i s  was never  done, no r  i s  t h e r e  ev idence  t h a t  it 
was e v e r  s e r i o u s l y  cons ide red .  The p o i n t  h e r e  i s  t h a t  o t h e r  
approaches  t o  p o l i c y  cou ld  have been fo l lowed which were based 
on o t h e r  assumpt ions  abou t  e q u i t y ,  e f f i c i e n c y  and e x t e r n a l i t i e s .  
3 .5 .3  The Evidence Concernina t h e  E f f e c t s  of Rea iona l  
P o l i c y  on P o p u l a t i o n  and Income D i s t r i b u t i o n  
To what e x t e n t  h a s  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  been s u c c e s s f u l ?  The 
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  w e  have advanced i n  S e c t i o n s  3 .3  and 3.4 con- 
c l u d e d  t h a t  t h e  growth p o l e  p o l i c y  o f  Japan i n  t h e  1960s 
--which s t r e s s e d  " p l a c e "  p r o s p e r i t y  o v e r  "peop le"  p r o s p e r i t y - -  
f a i l e d  i n  any meaningful  way t o  h e l p  d e c e n t r a l i z e  p o p u l a t i o n  
and employment. S i m i l a r l y ,  w e  have shown t h a t  r e g i o n a l  i n v e s t -  
ment p o l i c y  i n  g e n e r a l  d i d  l i t t l e  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  s p a t i a l  
d i s t r u b u t i o n  of  economic a c t i v i t y ;  see, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  S e c t i o n  
3 .2 .2 .  U n t i l  t h e  l a t e  1960s,  t h e r e  was r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  p u b l i c  
inves tment  i n  l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s .  
Y e t  some p o p u l a t i o n  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  was t a k i n g  p l a c e  d u r i n g  
t h a t  t i m e  p e r i o d .  A s  w e  have shown i n  Glickman [1977b1 4 2  t h e r e  
was a  s h a r p  d e c l i n e  i n  o u t m i g r a t i o n  from l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  
1960s. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  peak y e a r  o f  i n m i g r a t i o n  t o  t h e  t h r e e  
l a r g e s t  m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a s  was 1962. Mera [I9761 shows t h a t  
t h e  number of r a p i d l y  d e p o p u l a t i n g  p r e f e c t u r e s  f e l l  from 36 
i n  1953 t o  28 i n  1965 t o  o n l y  3  i n  1974. I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  
u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  t h i s  t r e n d  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  began 
p r i o r  t o  most o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  government ' s  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  
e f f o r t s  were p u t  i n t o  e f f e c t .  W e  have no ted  t h i s  i n  Glickman 
[1977b, F i g u r e  21. T h e r e f o r e  it i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a r g u e  t h a t  it 
was government p o l i c y  which produced t h i s  change i n  m i g r a t i o n  
~ a t t e r n s .  
A second phenomenon--one r e l a t e d  t o  p o p u l a t i o n  deconcen- 
t r a t i o n - - h a s  been d e c l i n i n g  i n t e r r e g i o n a i  income i n e q u a l i t y  
o v e r  t i m e .  Mera [I9761 i n d - i c a t e s  t h a t  one i n d e x  of  income d i s p a r i t y  
( t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  h i g h e s t  and l o w e s t  i n d i c e s  o f  pre-  
f e c t u r a l  p e r  c a p i t a  income) f e l l  by 30 p e r c e n t  between 1962 and 
1972. T h i s ,  he a r g u e s ,  h a s  reduced t h e  p r o p e n s i t y  f o r  p e o p l e  
i n  poor  r e g i o n s  t o  m i g r a t e  t o  r i c h e r  ones .  T h i s ,  t h e n ,  i s  
a n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  r e l a t i v e  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n .  Again, g r e a t e r  
e q u i t y  i n  c r o s s - r e g i o n a l  incomes p r e d a t e d  most government p o l i c y .  
4 2 S e e  a l s o  Vining [ I  9771 , Vining a11d Kontuly [ I  976, 19771, 
Kuroda [1969,  19771, Unno [ 1 9 7 5 ] ,  and Mera [1976] .  
One i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n  i n v o l v e s  t h e  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  
d e c l i n e  i n  income d i s p a r i t i e s  a c r o s s  Japanese  r e g i o n s .  Was it 
because  o f  income r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  programs of  t h e  government? 
O r ,  a s  some have  a rgued ,  h a s  it o c c u r r e d  because  of  t h e  de- 
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  of i n d u s t r y ?  S a k a s h i t a  [I9761 h e l p s  u s  answer 
t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s .  H e  c a l c u l a t e s  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  of  v a r i a t i o n  
( t h e  s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  d i v i d e d  by t h e  nean)  f o r  t h r e e  t y p e s  of  
p r e f e c t u r a l - b a s e d  income d a t a .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  p r e f e c t u r a l  i n -  
come p e r  c a p i t a ,  a measure which i n c l u d e s  wages and salar ies  
as w e l l  as t h e  r e t u r n s  from c a p i t a l  and t r a n s f e r  income from 
t h e  government; t h i s  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  t e r m  vx i n  Tab le  14. H i s  
second measure i s  p e r  c a p i t a  p e r s o n a l  income which e x c l u d e s  
r e t u r n s  from c a p i t a l  inves tments  ( v  i n  Table  1 4 ) .  T h i r d ,  
q  
h e  measures p r o d u c t i o n  income p e r  employee, t h e  sum o f  v a l u e  
added d i v i d e d  by t h e  number o f  workers .  S a k a s h i t a  n o t e s  t h a t  
a l l  t h r e e  measures of  income i n e q u a l i t y  have d e c r e a s e d  th rough  
t i m e ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n a l  income d i s p a r i t y ,  as measured by 
v  i s  d e c r e a s i n g  t h e  f a s t e s t .  Plost i m p o r t a n t  f o r  o u r  a n a l y s i s  
q  ' 
h e r e ,  i s  t h a t  v  ( p r o d u c t i o n  income) h a s  d e c r e a s e d  r e l a t i v e l y  
Y '  
l i t t l e ,  from 0.28 t o  0.26 from 1960 t o  1971. T h e r e f o r e ,  it i s  
n o t  th rough  t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  jobs  (which would produce  
more income i n  o u t l y i n g  areas and reduce  t h e  s i z e  of v  ) t h a t  
Y 
incomes d i f f e r e n t i a l s  have d e c r e a s e d .  A s  w e  can s e e  from Tab le  
1 4 ,  b e f o r e  1970 v  w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  vy; t h a t  i s ,  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  
X 
o f  p r e f e c t u r a l  income w a s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  d i s p a r i t y  i n  pro-  
d u c t i o n  income. But t h e  o p p o s i t e  w a s  t r u e  a f t e r  1970: t h e r e  
h a s  been t h e  unchanging r e l a t i v e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  p e r  worker  
i n t e r r e g i o n a l l y ,  w h i l e  t h e r e  h a s  been a  r a p i d  d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
d i s p a r i t y  of i n d i v i d u a l  incomes. The r e d u c t i o n  i n  income 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  which i s  shown by t h e  l a r g e  f a l l  i n  v  and v  
X q  
(23.7 and 30.9 p e r c e n t  r e s p e c t i v e l y  f o r  1960-1971) can  
b e t t e r  be  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  t a x  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  p o l i c i e s  of 
t h e  c e n t r a l  government i n  which p o o r e r  r e g i o n s  are a i d e d .  The 
government r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  program c a n  b e  s e e n  i n  two s t e p s  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  S a k a s h i t a .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  
from r i c h  t o  poor  r e g i o n s  through s u b s i d i e s  and t a x  programs.  
Second, t h e r e  i s  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h i n  r e g i o n s  by s u b s i d i e s  
from p r e f e c t u r a l  t o  l o c a l  government.  
T a b l e  14 
Changing I n t e r r e g i o n a l  Income D i s p a r i t i e s ,  
1956-1  972 
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  V a r i a t i o n  
P r e f e c t u r a l  Income P e r s o n a l  Income P r o d u c t i o n  Income 
p e r  C a p i t a  p e r  C a p i t a  p e r  Employee 
Year (Vx) (Vq) (Vy 
P e r c e n t  
D e c l i n e  23 .71  
1960-197'r  
The impor tance  of  t a x  and s u b s i d y  programs i n  r e d u c i n g  
i n t e r r e g i o n a l  f i s c a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  i s  shown by us  i n  Gencer and 
Glickman [ 19761 and Glickman [ I  977al . There ,  d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s e s  
of i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  r evenue  f lows  a r e  under taken  and t h e  sub- 
s i d i z a t i o n  of r e l a t i v e l y  poor c i t i e s  by t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  r i c h  i s  
demons t ra ted .  For  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  M i n i s t r y  of  Home A f f a i r s  
c a l c u l a t e s  " s t a n d a r d "  f i n a n c i a l  needs  and revenues  f o r  l o c a l i -  
t i es  which f a v o r  t h e  p o o r e r  c i t i e s  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  f u n d s .  
I n  g e n e r a l  w e  found t h a t  p o o r e r  c i t i e s  w e r e  f a v o r e d  by t h e  
c e n t r a l  government w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  d i s b u r s e m e n t  of  non- 
earmarked r e v e n u e s ,  t r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  and p r e f e c t u r a l  
d i s b u r s e m e n t s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  r e l a t i v e  advances  i n  l o c a l  
government f i n a n c e  he lped  i n d i v i d u a l s  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h r o u g h  
a  s m a l l e r  l o c a l  t a x  b u r d e n ) ,  t h e n  t h e  g o a l  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  e q u i t y  
was advanced.  
The Glickman [1977a] a n a l y s i s  a l s o  shows t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  t r a n s f e r s  on s p e c i a l  development  programs 
such a s  t h e  N I C s  and SAs. For  i n s t a n c e ,  a  r e g r e s s i o n  which 
e x p l a i n s  t h e  l e v e l  of  c e n t r a l  government t r e a s u r y  d i sbursement  
t o  l a r g e  c i t i e s  i n  1965-1970 i n c l u d e s  a  p o s i t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t  
f o r  a  dummy v a r i a b l e  f o r  t h o s e  c i t i e s  which w e r e  e i t h e r  N I C s  
o r  SAs. That  i s ,  c i t i e s  s o  d e s i g n a t e d  r e c e i v e d  r e l a t i v e l y  more 
t r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e m e n t s .  The s p e c i a l  d i s t r i c t  dummy v a r i a b l e  
i s  a l s o  an independen t  v a r i a b l e  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  l e v e l  of bonds 
t h a t  a  m u n i c i p a l i t y  may i s s u e .  
These r e s u l t s ,  coupled  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  S a k a s h i t a ,  i n d i c a t e  
a n o t h e r  method of r e d u c i n g  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  income d i s p a r i t i e s :  
th rough  t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  revenue sys tem which t e n d  t o  
f a v o r  t h e  p o o r e r  r e g i o n s .  
However, o u r  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  N I C s  w e r e  
n o t  overwhelming r e c i p i e n t s  of  c e n t r a l  government r e v e n u e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  t r a n s f e r s  sys tem.  T h i s  i s  shown 
i n  Tab le  15 where w e  p r e s e n t  s h a r e  q u o t i e n t s  f o r  t h e  N I C  
c e n t r a l  c i t i e s .  A s h a r e  q u o t i e n t  g i v e s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  l e v e l  
o f  r evenues  f o r  each  c a t a g o r y  compared t o  t h e  l e v e l  f o r  a l l  
c i t i e s  i n  o u r  sample;  t h e r e f o r e ,  a  s h a r e  q u o t i e n t  of  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  u n i t y  i n d i c a t e s  a  g r e a t e r - t h a n - a v e r a g e  s h a r e  of a  

p a r t i c u l a r  r evenue  i t e m .  The major  i t e m s  which w e r e  used  t o  
r e d i s t r i b u t e  r evenues  t o  p o o r e r  c i t i e s  were t r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e -  
ments and non-earmarked r e v e n u e s .  F o r  t h e  N I C s  i n    able 15,  t h e  
p i c t u r e  f o r  t r e a s u r y  d i s b u r s e m e n t s  i s  mixed. Seven of  t h e  
f i f t e e n  c i t i e s  had  s h a r e  q u o t i e n t s  o f  l e s s  t h a n  o n e ,  i n d i c a t i n g  
l e s s - t h a n - a v e r a g e  l e v e l s  o f  t h a t  revenue  c a t a g o r y .  N I C s  g o t  
r e l a t i v e l y  more non-earmarked revenues  i n  e l e v e n  c a s e s ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  hand; however,  t h e r e  a r e  some v e r y  low q u o t i e n t s  f o r  
Toyama and Niihama. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  e i g h t  o f  f i f t e e n  c i t i e s  
w e r e  f o r c e d  t o  c o l l e c t  more-than-average amounts of t a x e s  from 
l o c a l  s o u r c e s .  T h i s  t o o  shows t h e  r e l a t i v e  l a c k  of  t h e  under-  
w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  N I C s  development .  4 3 
T e n t a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s  t o  b e  drawn f rom t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n s  
are: ( 1 )  There  was some e f f e c t  of government t a x  and s u b s i d y  
programs on p o o r e r  r e g i o n s  i n  g e n e r a l ;  and ( 2 )  t h e s e  programs 
were n o t  w e l l - f o c u s e d  on t h e  N I C s .  The e f f e c t  on p e r s o n a l  
income i n e q u a l i t y  w a s  p r o b a b l y  s m a l l  b u t  t e n d i n g  towards  
g r e a t e r  e q u i t y .  
Another  way i n  which income d i s p a r i t i e s  have  been narrowed 
w a s  a r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  demand f o r  l a b o r  i n  i n d u s t r i -  
a l i z e d  r e g i o n s  which h a s  p u l l e d  workers  o u t  o f  p o o r e r  r e g i o n s  
i n t o  r i c h e r  o n e s ,  t h a t  i s ,  t h rough  t h e  m i g r a t i o n  p r o c e s s .  
There  w a s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  l a b o r  demand4' which h a s  
drawn worker s  away from poor  r e g i o n s  t o  t h o s e  a r e a s  w i t h  
abundant  j o b s .  The m i g r a t i o n  o p t i o n  i s  one which i n c r e a s i n g  
numbers of J a p a n e s e  have t a k e n  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  Ou tmigra t ion  
from poor  r e g i o n s  h a s  two p r i n c i p a l  advan tages  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
i n t e r r e g i o n a l  e q u i t y .  I t  r e d u c e s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  unemployment i n  
poor  r e g i o n s  and,  t e n d s  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l e v e l  o f  wages i f  l a b o r  
demand i s  assumed c o n s t a n t .  Ou tmigra t ion  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  
c a p i t a l / o u t p u t  r a t i o  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
4 3 ~ o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  c o n c l u s i o n s  are f o r  t h e  N I C S '  main 
c i t i e s  and may n o t  h o l d  f o r  t h e  s m a l l e r  ones .  However, s i n c e  
t h e  l a r g e  ones  d o n i n a t e  t h e  N I C  r e g i o n s ,  t h e i r  impac t  i s  prob-  
a b l y  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  c o ~ p a r e d  t o  o t h e r  n u n i c i p a l i t i e s .  
44T.here h a s  a l s o  been a r e l a t i v e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  demand 
f o r  l a b o r  f o r  t h o s e  r emain ing  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  t h r o u g h  govern-  
menta l  s u b s i d i e s  i n  r ice p r o d u c t i o n .  
of l a b o r .  I n  Japan ,  t h e  d e c l i n e  of  income i n e q u a l i t y  was 
d i r e c t l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  o u t m i g r a t i o n .  A s  Kabaya shows, 
e v e r y  p r e f e c t u r e  f o r  which p o p u l a t i o n  d e c r e a s e d  d u r i n g  t h e  
1960s had a h igher - than-average  growth r a t e  of p e r s o n a l  p e r  
c a p i t a  income d u r i n g  t h a t  p e r i o d .  
With r e s p e c t  t o  o u r  a n a l y s l s  h e r e ,  t h e r e  i s  v e r y  l i t t l e  
ev idence  t h a t  government p o l i c y  had any d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on 
m i g r a t i o n  b e h a v i o r .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  deconcen- 
t r a t i o n  o c c u r r e d ,  l i t t l e  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  government p o l i c y  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  m i g r a t i o n .  Migra t ion  o c c u r r e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  be- 
cause  of  g r e a t e r  job  o p p o r t u n i t y  i n  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  r e g i o n s  and 
because  of reduced income d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between r i c h  and poor  
r e g i o n s .  A s  t h e  income d i f f e r e n t i a l s  d e c r e a s e d ,  m i g r a t i o n  
(known a s  t h e  "U-turn phenomenon) took  p l a c e .  
What h a s  caused t h e  phenomenon w e  have obse rved?  The 
arguments  abou t  government p o l i c y  a r e  n o t  v e r y  p e r s u a s i v e .  
P o p u l a t i o n  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  and r e d u c t i o n s  i n  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  i n -  
come d i s p a r i t i e s  p receded  government p o l i c y .  S i n c e  government 
p o l i c y  fo l lowed  t h e s e  e v e n t s ,  it d i d  n o t  and c o u l d  n o t  have 
been a p r i n c i p a l  c a u s e .  The "concentration-then-deconcentration" 
phenomenon a p p a r e n t  i n  Japan and,  even more s t r o n g l y  i n  c o u n t r i e s  
such a s  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  may have been t h e  p r o d u c t  of o t h e r  
f o r c e s ,  some n o t  w e l l  unders tood .  A s  Vining  119771 a r g u e s  
and a s  w e  s t a t e d  i n  Glickman [1977b] t h e r e  may have been some 
s t r u c t u r a l  change which e f f e c t e d  Japanese  and o t h e r  
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  s o c i e t i e s  i n  t h e  l a t e  1960s and 1970s. These 
may be hav ing  i m p o r t a n t  e f f e c t s  on t h e  s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of p o p u l a t i o n .  Some have a rgued  t h a t  t h e  major  c o n t r i b u t i n g  
f a c t o r  t o  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  h a s  been t h e  s lower  growth which h a s  
o c c u r r e d  s i n c e  1973; s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  Mera [1g76] f o r  t h i s  
argument.  However, t h e  slow-down of  i n m i g r a t i o n  from r u r a l  
a r e a s  began l o n g  b e f o r e  1973 a s  we have ~ . o t e d  above.  Other  
r e a s o n s ,  such a s  env i ronmenta l  c o n d i t i o n s  and changing 
c u l t u r a l  v a l u e s ,  may have had some i n f l u e n c e  on l i v i n g  p a t t e r n s  
i n  Japan b u t  t h e s e  c a n n o t  supp ly  us  w i t h  comple te  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
of t h e  phenomena which w e  have obse rved .  
W e  r e t u r n  now t o  one fundamental  i s s u e  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
Japanese  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y :  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  economy. Through- 
o u t  most of  t h e  p e r i o d  under  s t u d y ,  it was t h e  major  g o a l  o f  
p l a n n e r s  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  t o  i n c r e a s e  o u t p u t  and e x p o r t s  
a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  and,  t o  do t h i s ,  i n v e s t ~ e n t  was concen- 
t r a t e d  i n  t h e  Tokaido mega lopo l i s .  I n t e r r e g i o n a l  e q u i t y  was n o t  
a  ve ry  i m p o r t a n t  g o a l  when compared t o  t h a t  of economy-wide 
e f f i c i e n c y .  The r e s u l t i n g  c o n c e n t r a t e d  p u b l i c  inves tment  
p a t t e r n s ,  o u t l i n e d  i n  S e c t i o n  3 .3 .1 ,  w e r e  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t h i s  
p o l i c y .  The d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  p u b l i c  inves tment  i n  t h e  l a t e  
1960s " fo l lowed  r a t h e r  t h a n  preceded t h e  change i n  t h e  t r e n d  
[ towards  d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n ]  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n "  a c c o r d i n g  
to Mera [P. 1976; 1 7 1 .  T h i s  y e a r  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  c o r r e c t  a s  w e  
have n o t e d  above. People  and employers  f o r  v a r i o u s  r e a s o n s  
began t o  f i n d  l a r g e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  r e g i o n s  less a t t r a c t i v e  and 
began t o  look f o r  o t h e r  l o c a t i o n s  f o r  homes and jobs .  P u b l i c  
inves tment  was made l a t e r  i n  s m a l l e r  and p o o r e r  r e g i o n s .  I t  was, 
a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  p l a n n i n g  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  a  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  which p r i v a t e  d e c i s i o n s  and e f f i c i e n c y  dominated p u b l i c  
d e c i s i o n s  and e q u i t y .  Deconcen t ra t ion  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e ,  b u t  
t h i s  phenomenon i s  much more a  p roduc t  of  p r i v a t e  d e c i s i o n -  
making and,  p o s s i b l y ,  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  change,  t h a n  of  p u b l i c  p l a n n i n g .  
I t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  sough t  by t h e  p l a n n e r s  
would have o c c u r r e d  l a r g e l y  w i t h o u t  p l a n n i n g .  P l a n n i n g  and 
t h e  i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l  t a x  sys tem c e r t a i n l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h i s  
p r o c e s s  b u t  o t h e r  e lement  appeared  t o  have been a t - l e a s t  a s  
i m p o r t a n t .  
4. REGIONAL DEVELOPmNT POLICIES IN OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES~~ 
4.1 Goals and Problems in Regional Development Efforts 
What regional problems are perceived and what are the goals 
of regional planning and policy in other developed, liberal 
capitalist countries, particularly in Europe? How may problems 
and goals there be compared to the situation in Japan?. In this 
section we .review some of these issues. 
One interesting aspect of our brief, comparative analysis 
is the relative uniformity of reasons that countries have under- 
taken regional development policies. These reasons are similar 
to those given by Japanese planners. First, there is the problem 
of "distressed" areas, especially those which have had large 
proportions of their working populations employed in the primary 
sector. This goal has important political support from legislators 
of these areas. Thus "place" prosperity has been one of the. 
major purposes for undertaking regional development. A second, 
and related, issue involves the attempt to reduce interregional 
income disparities. Large differences in income among regions 
have been exam-bed and deemed intolerable. Third, there is the 
goal of making the economy efficient with respect to production 
and exports. By reducing unemployment in backward areas, it is 
hoped that the economy will be more efficient and will have 
increased levels and growth rates of Gross National Product. 
As Cameron ([I9701 as quoted by Hansen [1974a; p. 161) points 
out: "although political pressures give regional policy its 
main justification and its even-changing vitality, efficiency 
arguments are never far below the surface." Cameron perceives 
efficiency in two senses. First, in terms of increasing the 
growth rate of national income and, second, in relation to the 
45~here are numerous studies of regional economic policy 
and planning in European and other Western developed countries 
which provide far more detail'than can be presented here. The 
interested reader may consult Allen and Maclennan [1970], Beika 
[1975], Brown [1972], Cameron [1970, 1974, 19771, Cao-Pinna 
[I9741 , Chapman [I9761 , Clawson and Hall [I9731 , c ma nu el [I9731 , 
Grbmion and Worms [I9751 , Hansen [I968 ,, 1974a, 1974bl i ~ a l k  
L1971] , Liggins [I9751 , OECD [1969,1974, 1976b1, and Sundquist 
[1975]. 
effective use of public funds for regional development purposes. 
Related to the questions of distressed regions, interregional 
income inequality, and efficiency, are two additional issues which 
have been discussed by policy-makers. One is the question of city 
size. The arguments are similar to those given by Japanese 
planners, that is,that the major cities are too large; this is 
particularly true of the experience of French regional planning 
where great efforts have been made to reduce the growth rate of 
Paris, but this has been true in other countries as well. The 
problem of controlling the size of large cities has been seen 
as complimentary to that of developing the rural, backward 
regions. 
The various countries also see the ramifications of 
regional imbalance similarly. The major problems involve the 
selectivity in migration choice (the younger, better-educated 
workers tend to leave poor regions),downward multiplier effects on 
local gross regional product as marginal firms and those oriented 
towards the market close down,and the loss of efficiency in the 
delivery of public services in the face of population loss and 
a declining tax base. 
The phenomena are also similar. The British worried about 
the "drift to the South" resulting in outmigration from the 
English North East, South Wales and Scotland and the heavy 
concentration around London. The French concerned themselves 
with the decline of the West, parts of the North and the Midi 
(South) simultaneously with the build-up of the Paris basin. 
In Italy,the long-term problems of the Mezzogiorno (the South) 
were under attack by regional planners. Declining agriculture 
and mining, outmigration from poor regionstand the alleged over- 
development of main centers are common to many European countries. 
As our reveiw of the Japanese in Section 3 indicated, similar 
problems have been seen there. 
4.2 Strateaies of Reaional Develo~ment 
The strategies undertaken by Western countries with regard 
to regional development are, as in Japan, dominated by considerations 
of place prosperity. One can see that in the attempts to develop 
t h e  l lezzogiorno o r  t h e  e i g h t  French mktrcp'o'les d1kqui1ibre.  The 
u s e  of growth c e n t e r s  a s  a  r e g i o n a l  development s t r a t e g y  i s  a l s o  
impor t an t ,  a s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  t h e  French mktropoles .  The purpose ,  
a s  w i t h  o t h e r  growth c e n t e r  e f f o r t s ,  has  been t o  g e n e r a t e  f u r t h e r  
economic expansion of  r e g i o n s  which had growth p o t e n t i a l ,  and 
t o  d i v e r t  economic a c t i v i t y  and popu la t i on  away from l a r g e s t  c i t i es .  
A s  w e  have noted i n  Glickman [1977c; s e c t i o n  5.2.2.1, p a r i s  
dominates France  t o  a  g r e a t e r  degree  t h a n  t h e  l a r g e s t  me t ropo l i s  
dominates any o t h e r  c i t y  system i n  a  developed count ry ;  see a l s o ,  
Prud'homrne [I9741 , ~ u n d q u i s t  [pp. 91-1411, and Grav ie r  [19471 . 
The use  of  g r ~ w t h  c e n t e r s  was seen  by t h e  French a s  a  way of 
l e s s e n i n g  t h e  domination of P a r i s  w i th  regard  t o  t h e  rest of t h e  
c i t y  system. I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  France ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  was d i f f e r e n t  
from t h a t  of  Japan.  Where Japan t r i e d  t o  develop r e l a t i v e l y  sma l l  
c i t i e s  i n  remote r e g i o n s ,  t h e  French mktropoles  (Lyon, M a r s e i l l e ,  
L i l l e ,  Bordeaux, Toulouse,  Nantes ,  Metz-Nancy, and S t r a sbou rg )  
form a  r i n g  around P a r i s ,  a r e  l a r g e r  on average  t h a n  t h e  
New I n d u s t r i a l  C i t i e s ,  and a r e  much less geog raph i ca l l y  remote. 
Regional  p l a n n e r s  have a l s o  d i s cus sed  t h e  advantages  o f  
d e c e n t r a l i z i n g  p u b l i c  inves tment  and t h u s  t o  b u i l d  up p u b l i c  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  l agg ing  r e g i o n s ,  i n  l i n e  w i th  r e g i o n a l  development 
p o l i c y .  I n  some c a s e s ,  t h i s  h a s  n o t  occu r r ed ,  however. Prud'homrne 
Cp. 481 concludes  t h a t ,  f o r  France ,  " t h e  s p a t i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  
p u b l i c  inves tments  do n o t  f o l l ow  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  p r e s c r i p t i o n s . "  
I n  g e n e r a l ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t , a s  i n  Japan ,  r e g i o n a l  p l a n n e r s  c o n t r o l  r e l a y  
46 
t i v e l y  s m a l l  budge ts  f o r  t h e  e f f e c t u a t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  . 
Most of  t h e  c e n t r a l  government! spending which has  a  d i r e c t  o r  i n -  
d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on r e g i o n a l  m a t t e r s ,  remains i n  t h e  c o n t r o l  of  
t r a d i t i o n a l  agenc i e s  which a r e  o f t e n  n o t  concerned w i t h  r e g i o n a l  
problems.  
Governments have used s e v e r a l  o t h e r  t o o l s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  p lann ing  
purposes .  The OECD [I9741 has  ca ta logued  them f o r  member coun . t r i es  
46 For  i n s t a n c e ,  DATAR, t h e  French agency which i s  i n  charge  
of  r e g i o n a l  development p o l i c y  s p e n t  on ly  $60 m i l l i o n  i n  1971, down 
from $70 m i l l i o n  t h e  p r ev ious  y e a r ;  see Sunqu i s t  [p .  1 2 0 1 .  OECD 
[1976; p. 211 s a y s  t h a t  t o t a l  French r e g i o n a l  development spending 
v a r i e d  between 200 m i l l i o n  and 500 m i l l i o n  f r a n c  i n  t h e  1960s and 
e a r l y  1970s .  For f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  French p lann ing  see, 
DATAR [1976b].  
and we show OECD's tally in Table-16. These other procedures 
principally involve tax and subsidy schemes to encourage capital 
to move to lagging regions: investment grants, public funds 
for building plants, loan programs, fiscal concessions, among 
them. We can see from Table 16 that Japan provided relatively 
few of such grants; the United Kingdom seemed to provide the most 
variety of grants and subsidies. 47 Also, technical assistance 
to relocating firms is available. Usually, these grants and sub- 
sidies are differentiated according to the severity of the regional 
problem. 
Less often used, but to some observers (such as Andersson 
[19741) possibly effective, are grants to employers to subsidize 
the hiring of workers. The British subsidized wages (to the 
amount of 65.25 per week in distressed areas in 1967) with some 
success, for instance. 
Both the British and the French have also employed various 
measures to prohibit factory construction in the London and Paris 
regions. For instance, construction of manufacturing plants in 
the Paris region with net floor area of more than 1500 square 
meters and office space of more than 1000 square meters is subject 
to a tax which varies according to location; see Sundquist 
[pp. 130-1311. Japan has tried similar controls for Tokyo and 
other large cities. 
4.3 Problems with ~egional Development Planning 
Despite the multiplicity of efforts by the different govern- 
ments in Europe and elsewhere, many observers argue that regional 
economic planning has not done very much to alter the spatial 
distribution of economic activity. There appear to be several 
reasons for this. First, the goals are often contradictory and 
confused. Second, plans lack enforcement power and financial 
backing from the central governments has not been forthcoming 
to the extent necessary to make structural change take place in 
backward regions or to prohibit growth in highly populated ones. 
47 Sundquist [pp. 37-901 discusses some of these schemes 
available in the United Kingdom. DATAR [1975, 1976a, 1976~1 provides 
additional information on subsidies and grants available in France. 

Thatrafter more than thirty years of effort in the Mezzogiorno, 
Scotland and the Massif Central, these regions are not much better 
off relative to other regions in those countries is testimony to 
the lack of success of planning relative to need. One of the prob- 
lems has been the fact that development funds have been spread 
too thinly. We have seen this in Japan; it is also true in France 
where help to the eight mbtropoles has been superceded by aid to 
a larger number of small-and medium-sized cities. There simply has 
not been enough money to make much difference to regions in serious 
need of development funds. 
A major problem is the lack of governmental power with 
respect to the power of the market. If firms are able to locate 
where profit is highest, as they are in the countries which we are 
discussing here, then spatial policy faces the dilemma that we have 
outlined in this essay. This is particularly true with respect to 
the internationalizahion of capital over the postwar period. 
Controls on foreign capital with regard to location are more 
difficult to enforce than controls on domestic capital. Although, 
this has not been a major problem in Japan where there is relatively 
little foreign capital, it is a significant factor in countries 
such as France where foreign capital's penetration in the national 
and regional economies is important. 
An additional problem in several countries has been the lack 
of control of the location of the service sector. This comes in 
part from the heavy emphasis on controlling location of manufactur- 
ing. Controls on office building in Paris and London have not been 
very effective in stemming speculative building which has occurred 
there. As a result, the centralization of the service sector in 
the post-industrial age has gone untouched by most regional planning 
efforts; on this, see Sundquist [pp. 111-1151. 
There are many other problems involved in regional planning, 
but space does not permit a fuller explication of them. Our con- 
clusion is that, in most instances, the goals and strategies of 
planners have not overcome the power of profit-maximizing entre- 
preneurs. Therefore, most of the regionz.1 problems which faced 
planners in the 1950s and 1960s continue to some degree. As the 
OECD [1974; p. 1381 concludes: "We cannot point to any country 
that has been able, despite determined and considerable effort 
over long periods, to achieve the objectives it has set for 
itself. " 
Yet, some changes in the regional economies have begun to 
occur. We have previously alluded to them in section 3 and in 
Glickman [1977b, Section 41.  There have been signs of deconcen- 
tration in many countries. The London region lost population 
absolutely during the 1961-1971 period paris, while still growing 
faster than most other regions in France, is not growing as fast 
as it was previously. The more peripheral regions in some countries 
are not losing population as quickly as formerly; some are now 
experiencing net inmigration for the first time in many years. We 
have argued in Section 3 that these phenomenon are not the result 
of planning, at least in the Japanese context. Here we argue, 
somewhat less forcibly because of our more limited review, that 
planning was probably not responsible for much of this change in 
migration patterns. This is true since not much emphasis has been 
placed on migration incentives (or hhnan capital approaches to 
planning, in general) in these countries and because outmigration 
from urban regions has been occurring in countries which have 
little or no planning at all. -The United States is a case in 
point; there, declines in the Northeast and North Central states 
and increased inmigration to the South and Southwest have occurred 
since the end of the 1960s. No one would argue that planning had 
anything to do with these trends in the U.S. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this essay, we have attempted to catalogue the development 
of Japanese regional planning and to evaluate its effects. We 
first discussed national economic growth and planning and indicated 
that the rapid national economic development which occurred in the 
1950s and 1960s was probably not the result of national planning; 
we contended that more traditional Keynesian tools were at least 
as effective. Then, we analyzed the regional components of national 
plans and strictly regional plans as well. In particular, we 
reviewed the experience of the New Industrial Cities and Special 
Areas. There we concluded that these programs did little to alter 
the spatial pattern of development. Furthermore, we argued that 
- 
the place prosperity programs may have been based upon wrong 
premises: that migration policies might have accomplished the 
goals of interpersonal inccme equity more easily. Of course, 
place programs have great political appeal (not only in Japan 
but in other countries), especially to legislators from the 
lagging regions. Thus these programs have been pushed vigorously 
by various Japanese governments. We also found that interregional 
income redistribution was taking place through the tax and subsidy 
system of the various ministries, especially the Ministry of 
Home Affairs; we discuss this element of Japanese political economy 
in much more detail in Glickman [1977a]. Finally, we compared 
the Japanese experience to that of other countries and found that 
many of the same problems were perceived, similar goals set and 
tools employed to counter the twin problems of depopulation of 
lagging regions and overcrowding of prosperous ones. We argued 
there that planning had little to do with spatial change in France, 
Britain,and other countries. There has been a trend towards 
disurbanization (see Berry [1976]) in many Western developed 
countries. The reasons for this phenomenon are not well under- 
stood but it is our contention that planning as currently practiced 
has not been responsible for it. More likely, factors like 
slower economic growth,cultural and- other factors have caused these 
changes in living patterns in much of the developed world. 
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